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Occasional Paper N° 27 April 2003 
FOUNDATIONS ON SAND: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST US OCCUPATION OF 
HAITI, 1915-1934 
This is the twenty-seventh in a series of documents concerning the language, history, and 
culture of Haiti to be made available through the University of Kansas Institute of Haitian 
Studies. Much has been published concerning the details of the first US Occupation of 
Haiti (e.g., Balch, Craige, Healy, Kuser, McCrocklin, Millspaugh, Niles, Plummer, Schmidt, 
Seabrook, Spector, Steedman, Wirkus — and of course the Heinls). Considerably less has 
appeared in print concerning its overall results. As Peter Bunce asks here, "Did it accomplish 
anything? Did anything it accomplished amount to anything?" (p. 32). Was it, as is so often 
stated, simply "a racist exercise in imperialism by the United States?0 In Part I Peter Bunce 
presents a broad outline of the actual events, and in Part II undertakes a penetrating analysis 
of the goals, attitudes and results of the Occupation, finishing with a brief examination of 
very recent Haitian history seen in the light of these preceding events. Included are valuable 
annexes detailing the actual make-up of the occupying force, less numerous than commonly 
believed, as well as very specific facts and figures relating to the unfortunately highly relevant 
fiscal background of the Occupation. The Bibliography is eloquently indicative ofthe research 
presented, including, to take only one example, the intriguing material brought to light from 
the 77 volumes perused of The Marine Corps Gazette. 
The 1915-1934 US Occupation of Haiti was almost certainly the most crucial period in the 
forming of Haitian-American relations. The reasons advanced were chiefly humanitarian, 
whereas the reality was reflected far more by geopolitical—and especially fiscal—concerns. 
In spite of many good intentions by good men such as General John H. Russell and Dr. 
George F. Freeman, the many results were lamentably essentially short-lived. Nevertheless 
it is too often overlooked that a large percentage of the rather imposing public buildings of 
Port-au-Prince, such as for example the beautifiil National Palace, were constructed during 
the period of the first Occupation. The concept of foreign aid is essentially a post-World 
War II one, and these buildings owe their existence not to US funding, but to Haitian funding 
applied, for once, to the public good instead of to graft and corruption. And these buildings 
are still very much with us today. But regarding general financial responsibilities, the US 
attitude at the time is well illustrated in Article V of the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty: 
'These customs duties collected will first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then 
pay off the public debt, third, pay for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and 
finally, meet the expenses of the Haitian Government.*' (See page 33 below.) 
My own personal experience with Haiti began in 1958, and starting in that period I had 
occasion to listen to Haitians of the elite class already adults in 1915. Several have admitted 
privately to me that they were at first frankly relieved at the arrival of US forces, given the 
political and financial chaos of the preceding years. As time wore on, however, their initial 
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reaction turned into displeasure, and finally hostility. We must keep in mind, though, that it 
is the members of this elite class who for so long had personally profited from the graft and 
corruption which the US Occupation put to an end. Thus at least some of the resulting 
radical patriotism was influenced by thwarted personal gain. To this underlying current 
must certainly be added, as anyone familiar with Haiti and Haitians is well aware, the strong 
feeling of national pride and dignity inspired by 'the Heroes of 1804" who overcame the 
three major powers of the time, the French, British, and Spanish, establishing the world's 
first Black nation whose independence was won on the field of battle. And of course since 
1804 there was the recurring nightmare of the possibility of the return of the Whites whose 
expulsion had cost so much Haitian blood, not to mention work without pay, i.e., slavery— 
as the corvee was interpreted (see below, page 17 and passim.). As for the mass of Haitians, 
this hurt pride was at least somewhat mitigated by the realities expressed in the account of 
"one old black peasant" found below on page 107. 
Those of us who teach Haitian history can offer several plausible explanations as to the 
causes of the 28 July 1915 invasion, but what is far more difficult to explain is just why it 
dragged on for so long. To begin with, there is the blatant hypocrisy of President Woodrow 
Wilson who, while preaching to both the European and the American publics about the right 
to self-determination of small nations, was at the same time trampling the rights of Haiti — 
to name only one small nation — for six of the eight years he was in office. His successors, 
Warren G Harding and Calvin Coolidge, did not appear to be overly concerned as the years 
wore on, and Herbert Hoover's only real action in this regard was to send to Haiti the Forbes 
Commission which —just as his reaction to the Depression—was fruitless. It took Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, 19 years, 2 weeks and 4 days after its start, to take concrete action and withdraw 
our forces. 
Probably the two most notable lasting results of the Occupation are: 1) national 
consciousness-raising, as articulated especially in the masterful 1928 book by Dr. Jean Price-
Mars, Ainsi Paria I 'Oncle (translated as Thus Spoke the Uncle) wherein it is made clear that 
Haitians are not simply transplanted Frenchmen with somewhat more pigment, but members 
of a fully independent culture which has created its own distinct language and its own 
distinct religion; and 2) the creation, for better or for worse, of a politically potent force 
which came eventually to be known as the Forces Armées d'Haïti. And well over three-
quarters of a century after its initial creation as the Gendarmerie d'Haïti, the United States is 
still blamed for its excesses. That President Jean-Bertrand Aristide abolished this force in 
early 1995 may be a permanent or a temporary situation. Why did or does Haiti need an 
army, except to oppress its own people? The most obvious foreign adversary would be the 
Dominican Republic, and as its long-time president, Joaquin Balaguer, has often stated, an 
invasion of Haiti would be sheer lunacy, taking on responsibility for all its problems, in 
addition to those of his own country. And the only other possible adversary, the United 
States, is so powerful as to render any available Haitian resistance quixotic. Yet the existence 
of the Haitian army is amply noted in the present Constitution, and certainly theoretically 
could thus be quite legally reconstituted. Every nation needs a police force, but—following 
the examples of Costa Rica and Panama—why does Haiti need an army? But then, will the 
existing Haitian police force turn into, in fact if not in name, another army? One remembers 
x 
only too well the Gendarmerie d'Haïti which became the Garde d'Haïti which became the 
Forces Armées d'Haïti. 
Perhaps the great fault of this long first US Occupation of Haiti involves the well known 
fish principle: if you love a man, you do not give him a fish — you teach him how to fish. 
It is always easier to do than to teach. The US forces in Haiti did much good: hospitals, 
roads, telephones etc., but they did not teach. Thus, the result after the Désoccupation was 
a gradual return to the status quo. 
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Appointed director of Service Technique, 
organized by John H.Russell to provide 
vocational (primarily agriculture) education 
to Haitians; his actions unfortunately helped 
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Major General commandant of the Marine 
Corps. 
Last President of Haiti prior to the US 
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1918; was blamed for much of the corvée 
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Woodrow Wilson President of the United States, 1913-1921. 
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LtCol, USMC 
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Conciliate Haitians to fullest extent consistent with 
maintaining order and firm control of situation, and issue 
following proclamation:4 Am directed to assure the Haitian 
people United States of America has no object in view 
except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian 
independence and the establishing of a stable and firm 
government by the Haitian people in their attempt to secure 
these ends. It is the intention to retain United States forces 
in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.' 
Acknowledge. 
Benson, Acting1 
(Radiogram from Department of the Navy to Rear Admiral 





Haiti Before the Occupation 
Haiti is the second oldest independent country in the New World, second only 
to the United States. Haiti first overthrew its the French overlords in 1791 in the 
wake of the French Revolution. It then suffered Spanish and British interventions, 
and a Napoleonic French invasion and attempted restoration of slavery in 1802, 
before finally achieving independence in 1804, all without significant outside 
assistance.2 According to legend, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the bloody successor to 
Haiti's national hero Toussaint Louverture,3 created the Haitian flag by ripping the 
white center out of the French Tricolor.4 Haitians are proud of their country and 
proud of their independence. 
By the turn of the 20th century, Haiti was a deeply troubled country. Its 
society, since the Revolution, had always been divided. In the absence of the French 
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colonialists—most of whom had fled the country by 1804, or were killed-the 
mulätres, the mulatto class, approximately three percent of the population, assumed 
the social role of the colonials. The peasantry, almost exclusively African in 
ancestry, remained peasants. The elite of Haiti, who for all intents and purposes ran 
(and run) Haiti, are largely, not exclusively, mulätres. Noirs, particularly those with a 
military background or powerbase, could become part of the elite, and often ruled 
Haiti. But Haiti was and is most often administered for the benefit of the elite, and 
the elite are heavily mulätre. "As in colonial Saint Domingue [Haiti], where the gens 
de couleur and black slaves hated each other, racial antagonism persisted between the 
elite and the black peasantry of Haiti."5 
When Haiti was a French colony, "Saint Domingue" was a rich jewel of the 
French empire—its exports were more than double of all of England's colonial trade 
in 1789.6 By the 20th century, however, Haiti was in debt, could not pay its bills or 
claims against it, and most of the Great Powers—save Russia and Japan-were 
threatening some kind of action. 
Political power in Haiti means the power to make money, usually through 
graft. "'Under [President Florvil] Hyppolite in 1890, 1891, and 1892, there was a 
carnival of contracts in the Chambers [Legislature]. Every party regular, senator, 
minister, deputy, or former volontaire de la revolution had at least one in the bag . . . 
Handsome favors, to be sure, that [the] Good Fairy handed out to the faithful who had 
just ravaged the four corners of the country with fire and sword."* Haiti's public debt 
increased from $4.4 million in 1891 to over $25 million in 1895 after a flurry of 
public works instituted by Hyppolite and his finance minister Frédéric Marcelin (who 
retired to France in 1895).7 
2 
Hyppolite's successor, Simon Sam, resigned in 1902 amidst a scandal concerning 
a debt consolidation loan from German and French interests and the loss of over a million 
and a quarter dollars in kickbacks and illegal payments. (Unusually, Sam's successor, 
Pierre Nord Alexis, prosecuted Sam and his immediate cronies in 1904, and Sam, several 
Haitians, a German, and two Frenchmen were convicted; not that anyone went to jail.) 
Nord Alexis feared foreign debt collectors (who were arriving with warships by this 
time8) and printed money instead of borrowing it. Paranoid, sometimes murderous, Nord 
Alexis, after two more brushes with civil war, fled to a French cruiser in favor of Antoine 
Simon in 1908. Simon and his immediate circle returned to the tradition of looting the 
public purse.9 
Surprisingly, given the United States' domination of the Caribbean after the 
Spanish American War (1898), American financial investment in Haiti was quite small: 
$4 million invested in Haiti compared with some $800 million in Mexico or $220 million 
in Cuba; a total of $ 1.7 billion in all of Latin America-10 About 65 to 70 percent of Haiti's 
imports came from the United States, the bulk of the balance coming from Germany and 
France. Between the Haitian elite's growing desire for foreign products, a severe drop in 
world agricultural prices in the 1890's (which affected all of Haiti's exports, except cheap 
labor), and aggressive foreign competition, Haiti by 1900 was severely dependent on 
foreign imports, and had a serious balance of payment^roblem.11 
France and Germany were the dominant financial players in Haiti at the turn of the 
20th century. France received about two-thirds of Haiti exports, and exported luxury 
goods in return- The Germans were striving to overcome the French in the Haitian 
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markets: they exported more to Haiti than the French, more Haitian exports were carried 
on German ships than French, and the Germans controlled the only railroad in Haiti, to 
the Plain du Cul-de-Sac east of Port-au-Prince.12 
The Banque Nationale d'Haïti was Haiti's treasury and fiscal agent. Instead of 
being a financial entity controlled by the Haitian government, it was a French stock 
company, owned principally by French banks, led by the Banque de VUnion Parisienne. 
It charged a commission on the Haitian issue of paper currency and on the cashing of 
checks. Since the French blacklisted Haiti on the world financial markets, so as to keep 
the Haitian account for themselves, the French fimneled all loans to the government 
through the Banque, often at outrageous discounts*.13 To give an example of French loan 
practices, Haitian obstacles to establishing a bank in 1874 were multiplied by the various 
political and financial thieves inside and outside Haiti: 
[Late 19th-tentuiy political leader Anténor] Firmin and historian 
Antoine Magloire say the loan was 60 million francs, to be repaid in forty 
annual installments of 7.5 million francs, a return of400 percent. [Dantès] 
Bellegarde says 50 million francs, but that the Crédit-Général in Paris was 
able to raise only 36.5 million, of which 26 million went to intermediaries 
and private pockets in Port-au-Prince and Paris, while the remaining 10 
million francs were used to liquidate, at par, a mountain of worthless 
Haitian bonds bought up as scrap paper by European speculators. The 
Crédit-Généralfs commission alone exceeded 9.5 million francs.14 
Finally chartered in 1880, the Banque Nationale d'Haïti lost its charter in 1905, 
after refusing to back Nord Alexis' blizzard of paper money. A five-year period of 
•Discounting was the practice of offering a loan at a certain amount, then subtracting fees 
and allowing for variable exchange rates up front, leaving the borrower with the balance 
to spend, but liable for repaying the entire amount, at whatever interest was agreed upon 
initially. 
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intense competition between French, German, and American (relative newcomers) 
banking interests ensued over rechartering a new bank. Finally, in late 1910, the Haitian 
legislature voted to dissolve the Banque Nationale d'Haïti, and created a new Banque 
Nationale de la République d'Haïti, which moved into the old Banque's headquarters. 
French banking interests, which put the package together with several German-American 
private banks, diplomatically invited in American interests (including the infamous 
National City Bank15). The French had a 75% interest in the new bank, the Americans 
and the German-American banks 20%, and the German Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 
Bank 5%. Not surprisingly, the new $13 million loan was discounted to $9.4 million.16 
Another notorious incident which demonstrates the inability of the Haitian 
government to control its own economy was the granting of a railroad concession to an 
American named James P. McDonald. Haiti promised to back bonds funding the railroad 
to the^Iaitiai^rorACT^ city of Cap-Haitien at six percent, pay McDonald regular 
payments as the railroad was completed, and grant him a fifteen-mile wide right of way 
for banana plantations (Haiti is only thirty miles wide at its most narrow point). In short, 
the government was prepared to give up roughly half the arable land in Haiti, and go still 
further in debt, in return for a railroad that was never completed.17 
After a mere 15 months in power, Antoine Simon began to lose control of Haiti, 
particularly in the north country around Cap-Haïtien (helped not in some small part by the 
boorish behavior of McDonald's American engineers). Simon and his army took ship to 
Gonaïves, landed, and moved north and seized Fort Liberté, pillaging and slaughtering as 
he went.18 
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The North had rebelled against Port-au-Prince before. Those of peasant stock 
who had lost their lands, and who rebelled at exploitation by the city dwellers and foreign 
concessionaires, drifted into the private armies of petty warlords in the wilds of the north 
country. Often described by Europeans and Americans as bandits or mercenaries, these 
men became known in Haiti as Cacos. Their loyalty was to their local chiefs, bound 
through family ties and patronage.19 Now, in 1911, these men and their leaders were to 
become the king (or president) makers of Haiti.20 
The Cacos rampaged through the north country (focusing, at least in part, on 
McDonald and his railroad camps), and boxed Simon into Fort-Liberté. Simon escaped 
to Port-au-Prince, but his time had passed. General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, a general 
with a northern power base, had Cincinnatus Leconte declared "Supreme Chief of the 
Revolution." Simon barely made it to a Dutch ship ahead of an angry mob. Less than 
two weeks later, 14 August 1911, Leconte was voted in as President by the National 
Assembly.21 
Leconte apparently was an honest man and, according to observers, was willing to 
try to administer Haiti honestly. Unfortunately, his administration lasted just under a 
year: the National Palace blew up with him in it in early August, 1912. (He and previous 
presidents apparently stored ammunition and explosives in the basement to keep it out of 
the hands of rivals.) The real cause of the explosion remains unknown.22 
Leconte's successor was Tancrède Auguste, a sugar plantation owner. His 
administration was marked with a continual fight with the new Banque Nationale over 
retiring the paper currency left over from Nord Alexis's administration. It was also short: 
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Auguste was dead the following May after a mysterious illness; some said poison. After 
a chaotic funeral, to the point of a near rebellion in the capital, Michel Oreste was voted 
in as President, literally bribing his way into office with drafts on the national treasury. 
Oreste, the first Haitian President to have no ties whatsoever with the military (regular or 
Caco), made almost everyone in any position of power in Haiti angry with his proposals: 
reform the Army, retire paper money, and reform the educational system (a great source 
of graft in the government).23 
In 1914, the Cacos, whose quiet had been bought by Leconte and Auguste but not 
Oreste, rebelled in the north country under the leadership of the Zamor family. The army 
soon went over to the Cacos. Michel Oreste took ship under the cover of British, 
American, French and German marines on 27 January 1914. Oreste Zamor, heading a 
Caco army with his brother Charles, was quickly elected President Oreste and Charles 
Zamor soon fell out with a former collaborator and rival, Davilmar Théodore. 
Unfortunately for the Zamor brothers, the Banque proved difficult with funding 
again, the Orestes ran out of money and, therefore, soldiers. Amid much chaos, Théodore 
and his ally Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, entered Port-au-Prince at the head of a Caco army as 
Oreste Zamor took refuge aboard a German commercial ship and his brother sought 
safety with a General Polynice and a Committee of Safety. Théodore was elected 
President on 7 November 1914. 
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Intervention and Occupation 
In January 1915, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton took command of the Cruiser 
Squadron of the United States Atlantic Fleet, flying his flag en the armored cruiser USS 
Washington (CA-11). The Atlantic Fleet's cruiser squadron had the additional 
responsibility of monitoring political events in the Caribbean, and Admiral Caperton's 
first mission upon assuming command was to tour his new area of responsibility. 
Admiral Caperton's first visit to Haiti was short and apparently uneventful. But he no 
sooner departed for other ports when he was recalled to Haiti. Still another revolt was 
forming in the north country of Haiti to challenge the Haitian presidency. This time the 
proclaimed "Chief of the Executive Power" was General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former 
President-maker, Caco leader, and now candidate for President. Admiral Caperton 
intercepted Guillaume Sam outside of Cap-Haïtien and persuaded him that the United 
States would not interfere with the transfer of power in Haiti, so long as Guillaume Sam 
curbed the behavior of his Cacos. Admiral Caperton and his gunboats and cruisers in 
effect shadowed Guillaume Sam down the coast to Port-au-Prince, where he was duly 
elected President on 4 March 1915.24 
In July 1915, the Washington, Rear Admiral Caperton embarked, sat in 
Port-au-prince harbor as still another Haitian presidency wound its way to a messy 
conclusion. This time it was Guillaume Sam who was besieged in his palace by a new 
challenger, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. At daybreak on 27 July 1915, Sam made a break for the 
French legation next door. Sam made it, although most of the people accompanying him 
did not. He sent a message to his chief of police, Charles-Oscar Etienne, at the Police 
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Arrondissement in the lower city, to the effect that his presidency was over and that 
Etienne should follow the dictates of his own conscience ["La partie est perdue, 
j'abandonne le pouvoir. Faites ce que votre conscience vous dictera."]. Accounts vary, 
but somewhere between 160 and 'nearly 200' political prisoners, from Haiti's muldtre 
elite-including ex-president Oreste Zamor, died. The next day, a mob of the elite 
attacked Guillaume Sam in the French legation and murdered him. Sam's mutilated body 
was dragged through the streets. Having received a green light from the State Department 
via the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Caperton met with the American and British chiefs 
of mission and the French minister aboard the Washington and, with their concurrence, 
decided to land troops and restore order.25 
While his small landing force secured the legations in Port-au-Prince, Admiral 
Caperton had a problem. With Guillaume Sam dead, there was no one really in charge in 
the city. There was a revolutionary committee formed by General Polynice,26 Charles 
Zamor (brother of the recently deceased ex-president), and others*, but no one, at least to 
American eyes, appeared to be in charge. The landing force was disarming what 
remained of the Haitian Army in Port-au-Prince (and confiscated five wagon-loads of 
weapons the first day), and the Haitian legislature was going through the opening stages 
of voting for still another new President. However, with the immediate crisis under 
control, Caperton didn't know what the United States Government wanted. The Secretary 
•Haitian politics in the late 19th, early 20th Century was a series of cycles of recurring 
personalities, the details of which are beyond the scope of this paper, however, it can be 
said that most of the personalities in the revolutionary committee were prominent figures 
in Haitian politics, although not all of them were necessarily supporters of the late 
President Guillaume Sam, or of Dr. Bobo for that matter. 
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of State, Robert Lansing was relatively new (his predecessor, William Jennings Bryan, 
resigned in June 1915, in a disagreement over President Wilson's handling of the 
Lusitania crisis), so he asked the President: "The situation in Haiti is distressing and very 
perplexing. I am not at all sure what we ought to do or what we legally can do . . . I hope 
you can give me some suggestion as to what course we can pursue." Wilson apparently 
answered the next day: 
I suppose there is nothing to do but to take the bull by the horns 
and restore order... 
1. We must send to Port-au-Prince a force sufficient to absolutely 
control the city not only but also the country immediately about it from 
which it draws its foods... 
2. We must let the present Haitian Congress know that we will 
protect it but that we will not recognize any action on its part that does not 
put men in charge of affairs whom we can trust to handle and put an end to 
revolution. 
3. We must give all who now have authority there or who desire to 
have it or who think they have it or are about to have it understand that we 
shall take steps to prevent the payment of debts contracted to finance 
revolutions. 
. . . In other words, that we consider it our duty to insist on 
constitutional government and will, if necessary (that is, if they force us 
to it as the only way), take charge of elections and see that a real 
government is elected which we can support.27 
Caperton radioed Washington DC on 5 August that the President of the Haitian 
Senate, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, appeared most electable, and that he "realizes Haiti 
must agree to any terms laid down by the United States, professes to believe any terms 
demanded will be for Haiti's benefit, [and] says he will use all his influence with [the] 
Haitian Congress to have such terms agreed upon by Haiti."28 To insure Dartiguenave's 
election, all Caperton had to do was neutralize the Cacos, take Dr. Bobo out of the 
running, and make sure the election in the Haitian legislature went for Dartiguenave. 
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The Marine 2nd Regiment landed in Port-au-Prince on 4 August 1915, and began 
securing the city. With the arrival of the remainder of First Provisional Brigade of 
Marines through August 1915, the Caco problem, at least in theory, would be settled in a 
matter of time (Annex A). 
With a flare of the dramatic, Caperton invited Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo to the 
American legation on 8 August and, speaking through his chief of staff, Capt. Edward L. 
Beach, who spoke excellent French by all reports, challenged the two to do what was 
right for Haiti. Not surprisingly, both men declared their devotion to the service of their 
country. Caperton, according to his Senate testimony in 1921, then asked: 
"Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be elected will you 
promise that you will exert every influence in your power to assist him for 
Haiti's good; that you will join with him heartily and helpfully and 
loyally?" 
"If Dr. Bobo is elected president I will give him the most loyal, 
earnest support in every effort he may make for Haiti's welfare," replied 
Dartiguenave, with simple dignity. 
"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartiguenave is elected president, will you 
help him loyally and earnestly in his efforts to benefit Haiti?" 
"No,I will not!" shouted Bobo. "If Senator Dartiguenave is elected 
president I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I 
alone am fit to be president of Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's aspirations, 
no one is fit to be president but me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be 
compared with mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me."29 
And so Dr. Bobo failed his interview. He left a week later, aboard a French ship, 
for Santo Domingo, where he was refused residence, and ended up in Cuba. He later 
moved to Jamaica, where he had a successful medical practice.30 
On August 10, Admiral Caperton received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy 
ordering that the election of the President of Haiti be allowed to take place and that "the 
United States prefers election of Dartiguenave. Has no other motive than that 
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establishment of firm and lasting government by Haitian people and to assist them now 
and at all times in future to maintain their political independence and territorial 
integrity."31 
The next day, at Admiral Caperton's orders, Captain Beach ordered the 
revolutionary committee in Port-au-Prince to resign. Admiral Caperton himself, and 
Captain Beach, both ended up arguing the term "free election" with the Bobo supporters. 
Dr. Bobo's backers believed that a "free election" would be one that would recognize his 
military position and elect him president. Admiral Caperton's definition allowed none of 
that. Finally, the 2nd Regiment of Marines secured the building and the Haitian 
legislature—39 senators and 102 deputies—met in the Chamber of Deputies. Captain 
Beach was present as Admiral Caperton's representative, and probably acted as an 
impromptu floor manager for Dartiguenave. "All senators and deputies were aimed at 
their own request." 
Dartiguenave was elected on the first ballot: "...the vote was announced as 94 for 
Dartiguenave, 16 for Bobo, and a scattering [31] for Cauvin, Thegun, and others." The 
United States formally recognized the Dartiguenave government on 18 August 1915.32 
While only a complete optimist would claim that the United States had no influence over 
this vote, a favorable vote of only 67% for the desired leader compares favorably with the 
more familiar rigged election results in excess of 99% common in the mid- and late 20th 
century. And, lest it be forgotten, Dartiguenave had his own agenda: 
Besides being a civilian with no army behind him (except, of 
course, the U.S. Marine Corps), he was the first elite mulätre from the 
South to take office since 1876—an office that, since the days of Boisrond, 
had been all but monopolized by noirs, generals, and men of the North and 
Artibonite. Not that Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave had no constituency: 
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his constituency, like that of Haiti's presidents for the next thirty years, was 
the elite. Numerically insignificant, usually without lucrative occupation 
save politics, this was the group that, now more than ever before, events 
were propelling into a monopoly of office and, to the extent the Americans 
would permit, of entrenched power.33 
Less than a month later, a Treaty between the United States and Haiti gave the 
legal underpinnings for the United States occupation of Haiti. Eighty years after the fact, 
it is hard to imagine a sovereign nation agreeing to such a treaty: it is as if an adolescent 
was surrendering his paycheck and check book to an over-bearing parent, to be put on a 
strict budget and with a solemn promise to behave. For the United States, it was 
contracting a huge responsibility against which we will later examine the results of the 
Occupation. 
Another byproduct of the American-Haitian Treaty was the Haitian Union 
Patriotique, which was to become the principal organization of Haitian resistance to the 
First Occupation. Interestingly, it was an organization of and for the Haitian elite, the 
opinion of the noir peasantry concerning the Occupation was apparently neither desired 
nor solicited.34 (A comment by the French minister in May 1916 (after the pacification of 
the Artibonite and the North by the Marines): "The peasants, the pure noirsj he wrote, 
'are, like the tradesmen in the towns, delighted with the American occupation."133) 
Even before the signing of the Haitian-American Treaty, Admiral Caperton, acting 
on instructions from the Navy Department, started taking over the financial and civil 
administration of Haiti.36 Like many aspects of the First Occupation, while this particular 
action was of dubious legality under international law, it was established and conducted 
with the intention of maintaining a scrupulous honesty. This had an immediate impact on 
the Haitian elite: 
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American assumption of customs control... for the first time 
brought home to the elite (which in this context is to say all politicians) 
some hard practicalities of foreign intervention. For that entire class, 
whose livelihood after all had been the public treasury, the blow, square in 
the pocketbook, was disastrous. (Footnote: Adding injury, Paymaster 
Conard promptly stabilized the gourde at a fixed (5 to 1) exchange rate for 
the dollar, thus at one stoke putting out of business the currency 
speculation, both Haitian and foreign, that had so often gutted the treasury. 
Emile Elie, Dartiguenave's Finance Minister, pled in vain to Conard that 
all his friends had been accustomed to make their living from a floating 
gourde and 'it would be an economic crime to ruin their business.'37 
Dartiguenave was unable to control Port-au-Prince's streets, and Admiral 
Caperton declared Martial Law on 3 September 1915. Apparently Dartiguenave told 
Caperton that this action would also facilitate the Haitian legislature's acceptance of the 
Haitian- American Treaty.38 
For the United States, the easiest part of the Treaty to implement would be the 
requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish law and order in Haiti. 
This would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haïti (in 1928 renamed the Garde 
d'Haïti). 
The forcing of the Haitian-American Treaty through the Haitian legislature was 
brutal—Admiral Caperton eventually had to threaten to withhold the Haitian government's 
paychecks until the Treaty would be ratified.39 The Americans were pushing for 
constitutional and legal changes in Haiti and Dartiguenave was unsure if he could deliver, 
especially with the "American insistence on eliminating graft, reducing palace patronage, 
stopping double or triple pensions to single individuals, and ending fraud and kickbacks 
on government contracts."40 
Using an ancient Haitian constitutional device, Dartiguenave dissolved the Haitian 
Senate 6 April 1916, and instituted a Council of State in its place. He then designated the 
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lower house a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution.41 Interestingly, a 
document from the Butler Papers (Butler was Chef of the Gendarmerie by this time), 
entitled "Coup d'Etat" details the reports the American had made on the closing of the 
Senate42. From the title, and its inclusion in Butler's papers, it would appear that Butler, 
his Marine Gendarmerie officers, or both, disapproved of Dartiguenave's action, even 
though it served American interests as well as Dartiguenave's. This is especially 
interesting, considering Butler's part in the closing of the Haitian legislature the following 
year. According to his testimony before the Senate investigating committee in 1921, 
Colonel Waller, who had been told by Dartiguenave that he feared impeachment, was 
also opposed to the action.43 
Nevertheless, Butler and Waller enforced the closure of the Senate and, when 
Dartiguenave decided that even the Chamber of Deputies was too difficult to work with 
and ordered legislative elections, Waller and Butler held elections and enforced an 
unusual honesty. According to Waller's proclamation, the role of the occupying forces 
was limited to maintaining order, restricting gatherings from closer than 30 feet from 
polling places, placing a representative in each of the polling places, allowing Gendarmes 
who were Haitian citizens to vote (but without their weapons), and some rules on party 
nominations and the prevention of fraud.44 Some observers view this election as more 
free of coercion than any in memory before it45 
However, as the primary purpose of the new legislature was to draft a new 
constitution (Haiti's 17th since independence), it was not going to be very cooperative. A 
draft constitution was written for the legislature by a Dr. Edmond Héraux—formerly 
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Antoine Simon's Foreign Minister in 1908-which was duly passed on to Washington for 
suggestions. Dartiguenave received said suggestions, and dumped them on the legislature 
as an American diet at. The legislature rebelled and started writing its own constitution 
with a decidedly anti-American tone. Dartiguenave apparently wished the Marines to 
close down the legislature for him, which would allow him to rule unimpeded by any 
other Haitian legal body. But as he deferred to Colonel Cole (Waller's successor), Cole 
deferred to Washington, who deferred to Dartiguenave. Dartiguenave finally called in 
Major Butler and ordered him to close down the legislature. It did not reopen until 1930. 
The American-amended constitution was then passed to an all-Haitian referendum 
in early 1918, and duly passed. The Gendarmerie enforced the honesty of the election, 
although it was admittedly and openly pro-constitution, and the elite apparently boycotted 
the referendum. And, despite his frequent claims to the contrary, Franklin Roosevelt did 
not write the Haitian constitution: the American "suggestions", incorporated in the 
Héraux draft, had their origin in the State Department.46 
Off to a Rough Start 
The Marine suppression of the Cacos brought peace to Haiti which, as noted 
above, was appreciated by the noirs and the tradesmen, if not the elite or the Cacos. 
Public order was maintained by the new Gendarmerie d'Haïti, a national police force, 
manned by Haitians and officered by Marines. 
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Public order, however, did not immediately bring financial stability, as World 
War I was consuming most of the liquidity in World money markets at the time, and 
nothing was available for a Haitian consolidation loan. With Haiti's heavy debt, most of 
the revenues collected by the Navy paymasters-although the former skimming off of 
funds was halted—went to debt service, and not for improving the Haitian infrastructure 
as desired.47 Main functions of government were therefore taken over by the 
Gendarmerie as it was the only organized "Haitian" entity capable of taking any kind of 
positive action in Haiti at the time. These functions included public health, prisons, and 
public works.48 Lacking sufficient funds to improve roads, bridges, and culverts, Butler 
found a provision in the Haitian rural code that provided for Haitians to provide labor in 
lieu of money for the payment of taxes. Butler used this labor, called the corvée, in the 
construction of rural roads. According to his testimony in 1921, he was able to bring the 
cost of building roads down to $205 a mile, from a pre-occupation cost of $51,000 a 
mile (a figure inflated, no doubt, by large amounts of graft). Butler "repaired" (rebuilt is 
probably a closer term) 470 miles of roads during his tenure as Chef of Gendarmerie. He 
took pains to provide food, shelter, entertainment, and motivation to the laborers, and 
went to the trouble to get President Dartiguenave out of Port-au-Prince to periodically 
praise the laborers' efforts. (Butler's papers include a collection of photographs of the 
first automobile trip taken in Haiti, outside of Port-au-Prince, apparently to 
Cap-Haïtien.49) 
Colonel Waller, in his testimony before the same Senate committee, told of an 
irrigation project in the Cul-de-Sac valley in which he received more volunteer labor than 
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he could employ and brought the project in at a cost of $800, down from a (Haitian) 
estimate of $60,000.5° 
The system, as might have been expected, also lent itself to abuse. The Marines 
made the mistake of having Haitian civil officials in the process of recruiting labor. 
These officials were not above using impressment instead of encouraging volunteers to 
get their numbers, nor were they above exempting certain persons who could bribe their 
way out of their labor obligation, and putting the work back on those who had already 
performed their obligation. Butler's successor, Major A. S. Williams, saw that the corvée 
system was being increasingly abused, and causing increasing Haitian discontent with the 
Americans, and abolished it on 1 October 1918.31 
Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, who succeeded Col. John H. Russell in 
command of the Marine brigade (Russell had succeeded Cole) in late 1918 after returning 
from combat duty in France, made a number of inspection trips, starting in March 1919, 
to investigate reports he had received of abuses of the corvée in the Hinche and Maïssade 
districts. General Catlin found that the corvée was still in force in these districts and was 
using impressed labor. In addition, much of the labor was being used for private projects 
as opposed to public works.52 The abuses of the corvée were probably more extensive 
than General Catlin was able to discover on his inspections, as the ensuing revolt, which 
Marine officers believed to have originated concerning discontent over the corvée (which 
in itself resurrected the old paranoia about blancs reinstating slavery), became 
widespread. The popular leader of the revolt, Charlemagne Péralte, a former Caco 
General and a brother-in-law to the Zamor brothers, had been serving a sentence of hard 
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labor in Cap-Haïtien when he bolted for the mountains, taking his gendarme guard with 
him. Charlemagne, and his successor after his death, Benoit, were found to have political 
and financial connections with Dr. Rosalvo Bobo.53 
The revolt would last until 1920. But if that had been the Marines' only problem 
in Haiti, no one in Washington DC would probably have noticed. However, late in 1919, 
Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps George Barnett was reviewing a court 
martial case of two Marine privates accused of unlawfully executing Caco prisoners. His 
eye caught an argument by the Marines' counsel to the effect that such executions were 
rather common in Haiti. Barnett was shocked. He immediately fired off a letter to Col. 
Russell (who had reassumed command of the Marine Brigade after General Catlin 
returned to the United States) ordering him to investigate and correct the situation 
immediately. Col. Russell investigated, found abuses, and started the slow process of 
military justice* 
Unfortunately, General Barnett's letter to Colonel Russell got into the papers.54 
Despite Col. Russell's investigation, a later investigation by General Barnett's successor, 
Major General John A. Lejeune, and now-Brigadier General Butler, and a formal Naval 
Board of Inquiry chaired by Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, all of which found that 
military justice had been imposed on all those who were guilty, within naval jurisdiction, 
and within the statute of limitations55, the bad press continued. In particular, The Nation 
accused the Marines of "racial snobbery, political chicane" and "torture...theft, arson, and 
murder" . . . "actual slavery" . . . and a "five-year massacre of Haitians." The upshot was 
a Senate investigation which lasted from 1921 to 1922, sat in Port-au-Prince and as well 
19 
as Santo Domingo, and allowed a representative of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and the Union Patriotique advisory rights with a right to 
cross examination;56 and yet found that most of the charges had been greatly exaggerated: 
On the evidence before it the committee can now state— 
(1) That the accusations of military abuses are limited in point of 
time to a few months and in location to restricted area. 
(2) Very few of the many Americans who have served in Haiti are 
thus accused. The others have restored order and tranquillity under 
arduous conditions of service, and generally won the confidence of the 
inhabitants of the country with whom they came in touch. 
(3) That certain Caco prisoners were executed without trial. Two 
such cases have been judicially determined, the evidence to which 
reference has been made shows eight more cases with sufficient clearness 
to allow them to be regarded without much doubt as having occurred.57 
The committee also noted that the thrust of most of the accusations had been an 
effort to discredit the entire Occupation of Haiti.58 More importantly, the Committee 
noted that the Occupation was not serving its goals and recommended changes: 
• "... [place] within reach of the Haitian masses, justice, schools, and agricultural 
instruction... [and]... send to Haiti a commission comprising a commercial 
advisor, an expert in tropical agriculture, and an educator..." 
• "..advise the Haitian government against permitting foreign interests to acquire 
great land holdings in Haiti." 
• "...as communications are opened up and as the peasants are secure in their life and 
property, . . . reduce the force of Marines in the territory of the Republic and 
ultimately to intrust the maintenance of order and peace exclusively to the 
gendarmes." 
• Eliminate provost courts for civil crimes and "offenses by the press against public 
order." 
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• Raise the caliber and qualifications of the Americans who represent the United 
States in Haiti.59 
Interestingly, almost a year earlier, President Harding had apparently solicited an 
evaluation of the Occupation from the State Department shortly after his inauguration in 
1921. Written by Sumner Welles, who at the time was Chief of the Latin American 
Division of the State Department and who would become the American High 
Commissioner in the Dominican Republic in 1922,60 it recommended similar changes in 
the Occupation and its administration: 
• Increase the size of Gendarmerie d'Haïti in order to increase public order. 
• Appoint a single representative of the United States to represent the President in 
Haiti and subordinate all United States Treaty officials" to this representative. 
• Change the basic supervision of the Occupation of Haiti from the Navy Department 
to the State Department, which would presumed to be more diplomatic in budget 
items, for instance. 
• Develop the Haitian economy, principally by reforming the Haitian education 
system.61 
Thus, getting recommendations from all sides, the Occupation of Haiti entered a 
period of great change and, ultimately, some progress. 
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Smooth(er) Sailing 
On 10 March 1922, John H. Russell, twice former commander of the First 
Provisional Brigade of Marines in Haiti and recently promoted to Brigadier General, 
became the United States High Commissioner in Haiti.62 
According to the American-sponsored Haitian constitution of 1918, a Haitian 
President served for a term of four years, and could be immediately reelected for a second 
term. However, under the Title VII, Transitory Provisions of the constitution, the sitting 
President-Dartiguenave—was the one who decided the next legislative elections, it being 
the Haitian Senate which would elect the President. The Senate itself had not sat since 
1916, when Dartiguenave with, if not the approval, at least the assistance of the 
Americans, locked it out of the legislative building (above). In 1921, Dartiguenave's 
representatives began feeling out the Americans about reelection without the 
inconvenience of legislative elections. The State Department proved coy on this particular 
request, apparently preferring legislative elections if Dartiguenave wanted reelection as 
President. 
To make a long story short, Dartiguenave preferred not to suffer legislative 
elections and the Americans preferred a new President. Dartiguenave had proved 
unpopular among the Haitians and, in particular, the Haitian elite for years. So it was 
with little sorrow that Dartiguenave was out-maneuvered in his own Council of State. 
Louis Borno, one-time Foreign Minister for Dartiguenave, was elected President in May 
1922. On the 15th, "for the first time since Nissage-Saget [President 1870-74] and only 
the second time in the history of Haiti, a constitutional transfer of power took place."63 
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Louis Borno, like Dartiguenave, would be still another client-President of Americans,64 or 
a strong-willed Haitian with his own agenda,65 depending on which interpretation of the 
First United States Occupation you prefer, but he and John Russell could at least work 
together in an atmosphere approaching mutual respect, and things were accomplished. 
With the end of World War I, and a world recovery taking place, the Haitian 
Government finally solicited a S16 million loan on which there were serious bids. The 
National City Bank took high bid of 92.137 [%] in 1922 (which means a discount of just 
under 8%, which compares rather favorably with loans taken by the Haitians prior to the 
Occupation) at 6% interest. Of the $16 million face value of the loan, the Haitians were 
therefore able to actually see over $15 million of it, which went to retire the claims of the 
National Bank and the National Railroad, and refunded three outstanding French loans. 
A second loan, also funded through National City Bank for some $5 million, paid off 
73,269 claims against the Haitian government settled by a joint American-Haitian claims 
commission. A third loan for $2.66 million, this time through the Metropolitan Trust 
company of New York in 1923, finally relieved Haiti of the financial albatross of Mr. 
McDonald's National Railroad plan.66 
Although, besides a peaceful transition of political power, arguably the greatest 
contribution to Haiti made by the occupation, to quote the British minister in Haiti in 
1929, was that it "maintained peace and allowed the peasant to work in safety." Other, 
more tangible results were to the Occupation's credit during the Louis Borno-John Russell 
period: 
• over 1000 miles of roads, with 210 bridges, serving 3000 motor vehicles; 
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• nine major airfields and numerous auxiliary fields; 
• 15 modern lighthouses (as opposed to three antiques in 1915), 54 buoys, ten harbor 
lights and other aids to navigation; 
• restoring a functioning telephone and telegraph system; 
• ten towns with running, potable water, and 64 villages with clean wells, in addition 
to irrigation projects; and 
• a Service de Santé Publique which included 11 hospitals—98% staffed by Haitians, 
and 147 public clinics, not counting three military hospitals and the Catholic 
hospital in Port-au-Prince.67 
One area in which the Americans encountered an immense amount of resistance 
was in the area of public education. In his memo for President Harding, Sumner Welles 
accused the Haitian elite of publicly funding education at adequate levels, while actually 
pocketing the bulk of the money for themselves.68 In 1923, General Russell instituted a 
e 
Service Technique de 1'Agriculture et de VEn^gnement Professiormel, or Service 
Technique as it became known, to provide an agricultural educational system for the noir 
peasantry under Dr. George F. Freeman. This was "a matter of extreme social sensitivity 
for the elite," who feared both the social consequences of an educated noir peasantry and 
the loss of the noirs' loyalty to the blancs, who were improving their lives.69 
The "show window" of the Service Technique was the Central School of 
Agriculture at Damien where 
[in] the way of things in Haiti, and more particularly because such studies 
required literacy and prior preparation, the students came from elite 
families, though, alas, with no more appetite for the dunghill side of 
agriculture (let alone for going out into the country to instruct peasant 
noirs) than their predecessors at Turgeau [a reference to the Haitian forces 
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under Dessalines who took Port-au-Prince in October 1803]. To overcome 
such reservations, there was adopted a system of scholarships, or bourses, 
whereby each student received the not-inconsiderable sum of $25 a month 
and, as Dr. Freeman was later quoted in the New York World, was 
'virtually hired to go, by means of scholarships/ This incentive 
notwithstanding, student bousiers concentrated on academic work while 
hired peasants dug ditches, cleaned stables, slopped hogs, and shoveled 
manure.70 
The American attempts at educational reform were also strongly resisted by the 
Catholic church in Haiti, which saw its system of confessional schools threatened by the 
proposed American system. The Church had been in opposition to the United States 
Occupation since 1915, when they declined to perform the traditional Te Deum to mark 
Dartiguenave's election. This appears to be primarily a jurisdictional and religious (the 
Catholic church appeared to view the advent of the Americans in 1915 as the advent of 
rampant Protestantism) issue, as opposed to a nationalist issue, because the Haitian clergy 
was 30 times more French and French-Canadian than Haitian.71 
Needless to say, elite students, and not just those in the Service Technique, were 
highly politicized, nationalist, and, almost by definition, anti-American. Louis Bomo, by 
1929, had also overstayed his political welcome, so students were anti-government as 
well. 
What touched everything off was a seemingly innocent decision by Dr. Freeman 
of the Service Technique. Dr. Freeman needed funds to set up some experimental 
stations at Hinche—to serve the noir peasantry rather than just the elite students—and 
proposed on cutting back on bourses and paid labor at the main facility at Damien. The 
students went on strike, and were quickly joined by sympathy strikes in other elite schools 
in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. President Bornors reaction was initially restrained by 
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General Russell, although Russell did cable Washington to request reinforcements for the 
Marine Brigade in case the Garde d'Haïti (the Gendarmerie d'Haïti had been redesignated 
on 1 November 1928) proved unreliable. 
The unrest continued through November 1929, until the first week in December, 
when the situation at Les Cayes suddenly got out of hand. The peasantry of the region, 
for reasons other than why the students revolted, rebelled after agitators from 
Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien had their say, and headed for the town of Les Cayes. A 
patrol of 20 Marines stood in their way. The confrontation eventually got out of hand, 
and 12 Haitians died. President Hoover, who had been inaugurated that year, called for 
an investigation.72 Given President Hoover's predisposition to get out of Haiti, it is hardly 
surprising that the resulting Forbes Commission recommended that the Occupation be 
terminated as soon as possible.73 
Haitianization 
The United States Government signed an agreement in 1931 with the Haitian 
Government for a rather quick "Haitianization" of the Treaty services in Haiti and the 
eventual withdrawal of all United States forces from Haiti. Louis Borno stood down as 
President in early 1930, and the Council of State elected Eugène Roy as the new 
President. He took office on 15 May 1930; the first Catholic Te Deum since 1914 was 
said for the new President. Ironically, in a flurry of legislative machinations that 
represented a bitter struggle between the mulätres and nationalistic noirs, Sténio Vincent, 
a light skinned noir, was elected President in November 1930.74 It appears that the 
United States Mission in Haiti originally believed that the United States Occupation 
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should last until at least 1936, in order to reassure holders of Haitian government bonds. 
However, the State Department, and presumably President Hoover, wished to complete 
the process before the lapse of the Haitian-American Treaty of 1915. The agreement on 
Haitianization, which included no actual date for the termination of the Occupation, 
although most other Treaty services were given transition dates, was signed 5 August 
1931.75 
A final agreement for the withdrawal of United States military forces was 
eventually agreed upon and signed with Haiti on 7 August 1933, with a termination date 
of 1 October 1934. However, after conversations between President Vincent and 
President Roosevelt, in Cap-Haltien in July of 1934, the date was moved up to 1 August 
1934.76 
Aftermath. 
The actual withdrawal of American troops in Haiti was somewhat of an 
anticlimax: most equipment and troops were withdrawn from Haiti prior to the actual 
withdrawal date. On 1 August 1934, at Marine Brigade headquarters, the American flag 
was lowered, with honors, and the Haitian flag was raised, with honors. The last aircraft 
from Marine Observation Squadron Nine left Bowen Field outside Port-au-Prince and 
flew back to the United States.77 For the Haitians, the "Second Independence" was one 
big, long party.78 
The Constitution, modified in 1928, was again changed in 1935 to invest more 
power in the President. According to the first Haitian Chef of the Garde d'Haïti— 
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Démosthènes Calixte, the same officer who was the Haitian deputy of the then-new Ecole 
Militaire in 1922 under General Russell~the Garde was rapidly politicized, beginning in 
1934.79 This same officer offers some observations (1939) to what happened to the 
institutions left the Haitians by the United States Marines Corps and Navy: 
• The Sanitation and Hygiene Service, which was originally an organization 
trained by the officers of the Medical Corps of the United States Navy, has lost 
its real purpose as an institution. The persons responsible for its administration 
are rank politicians and the most ill-bred officials Haiti ever had. 
• The Public Works Administration was also organized by officers of the Civil 
Engineer Corps of the United States Navy. But since its "Haitianization", it has 
become merely a payroll institution for all the friends of the President who are 
jobless, as well as those who do not care to work. The engineers and architects 
in charge of various departments cannot do anything to remedy the situation. 
This is why this service has spent so much money and Haiti still has no roads, no 
bridges, and no sewers in areas where such construction is badly needed. 
• The Agricultural and Rural Education Service... was, after its "Haitianization" 
placed under another foreigner, a Belgian, who resigned in 1938. This 
department could have rendered great service if the five-year plan submitted by 
the scientific agriculturist-in-charge had been approved by the government... 
Political opportunism was rampant. No attempt was made even to try the plan. 
• The Contribution or Internal Tax Service was also organized by Americans. The 
Haitians who have replaced the Americans are competent and honest; but again 
political interference was followed by embezzlement of Government funds, 
which of course went unpunished. 
• Education is purposely neglected for the benefit of politics and social prejudice. 
The method of education in Haiti has always been a matter for "discussion." 
The removal from office of competent administrators and personnel of the 
Education Department for political reason renders the problem practically 
insoluble. 
• There cannot be an independent press in Haiti, because of the enactment of a law 
against a free press. A 'state of siege1 is maintained by the present government, 
but even in time of peace no one can express an honest opinion as to the general 
condition or administration of the country without being mistreated.80 
Other observers, even those hostile to the United States Occupation, have noted 
the deterioration of the infrastructure: "American civil service reform, for instance, had 
little impact. After the occupation, Haitian politics reverted to the 'spoils system' whereby 
successive administrations installed their own partisans in public office." 
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"...The network of roads, potentially the most significant legacy of the occupation, 
didn't last long because almost all roads were unpaved and required elaborate 
maintenance."81 
President Vincent became a dictator in all but name by late 1938. He was 
eventually maneuvered out of power by Elie Lescot in 1941. Lescot was exposed in 1945 
as a virtual agent for Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (by the Dominicans). Students 
and rioters took to the streets. In January 1946, the Garde, headed by an Executive 
Military Committee [Comité Exécutif Militaire] led by a Colonel Lavaud (a mulätre) took 
charge. The result was chaos—rioting, looting, arson—with an ugly racial—noirs versus 
mulätres-tone, although there apparently was even some Communist influence in the 
violence as well. 
The Comité eventually restored order, resurrected the 1932 constitution, and 
returned Haiti to a state approaching normalcy. In August 1946, presidential elections 
were held. Dumarsais Estimé, an Artibonite noir, was declared the winner, a Te Deum 
was said in his honor, and the Garde went back to the barracks. 
Estimé enacted a new constitution in November. The Garde was redesignated 
"L'Armée d'Haïti" and its police functions were theoretically separated from the military 
functions. Estimé was a populist as well as a noir, and he nationalized the Standard Fruit 
holdings as well as instituted an income tax for the elite. He also was seen as a threat by 
Trujillo, who worked steadily to destabilize him. 
Estimé declared a state of siege in 1949 because of the threat from the Dominican 
Republic. Faced with a loss of income from the Standard Fruit nationalization and other 
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causes, he suddenly required every worker to buy government bonds redeemable in 1959, 
which proved immensely unpopular. So did Estimé's efforts to be reelected President, 
despite a constitutional prohibition against presidents succeeding themselves. His 
attempt at modifying the constitution was blocked in the Haitian Senate, even though the 
attempt was popular with the masses. Finally, the army, with rioting groups supporting 
both sides of the position in the streets, faced Estimé on 10 May 1950 and told him he 
had resigned. 
Initially, Colonel Franck Lavaud was the new President. However, Colonel Paul 
Magloire, initially declared the Minister of the Interior in the new junta, was the real 
power in the group. New national elections were declared on 3 August, and Magloire 
resigned from the junta to run for President He was opposed by the Communist Party 
and an architect who wanted to execute Estimé. Elections on 10 October finalized 
Magloire's presidency, reflecting the popular opinion of most Haitians.82 
In the end, however, Magloire fell prey to the fatal disease of all Haitian elected 
Presidents: the desire to hold on after his term of office would expire. Magloire 
attempted a coup against himself—he resigned as President and, as commander in chief of 
the army, declared himself Chief Executive Power (shades of 1915). The constitution 
was suspended and dissidents jailed. The people took to the streets in a general strike, the 
army refused to support him, and Magloire fled to Jamaica in exile on 12 December 
1956.83 Time didn't give his fall much play, the big news that Christmas was the crushing 
of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet tanks. 
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Magloire's immediate successor, Nemours Pierre-Louis, took office the same day 
he left. He resigned 55 days later. 
Haiti entered another riotous election cycle. Rioters stormed schools and attacked 
mulätres. The army—whose back pay had been mysteriously paid by Dr. Francois 
Duvalier, an old follower of Estimé-attempted to gain control under Colonel Armand. 
Opposed by loyalist elements, the coup failed. Rioting and looting prevailed in 
Port-au-Prince. 
On 26 May 1957, Daniel Fignolé was inaugurated as President He didn't last 
long. The man he appointed as head of the Army turned on him and demanded his 
signature on a letter of resignation on 14 June. Fignolé and his family were immediately 
flown out of the country. Duvalier was steadily gaining support in the army and in the 
country as well. On 22 September, Francois Duvalier, was elected President by a ratio of 
three votes to two.84 
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Part II 
An Analysis of the Occupation 
Looking at the bleak history of the Occupation and its aftermath, there are a 
number of questions which come to mind. Did it accomplish anything? Did anything it 
accomplished amount to anything? If the answers to the first two questions are yes, what 
happened to Haiti? The Occupation was scarcely over before Haiti seemed to revert to its 
bad old ways. 
Goals of the Occupation 
There is little written concerning the United States' goals for the Occupation, and 
it is not difficult to find those commentators who denounce the entire occupation as a 
racist exercise in imperialism by the United States.85 One of the few hints about actual 
goals is Sumner Well's memorandum for President Harding, talking about the lack of 
progress in the occupation based on what was stated in the 1915 Haitian-American 
Treaty. 
The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty is often denounced as an ex post facto Treaty 
that served only to justify the American occupation.86 It was certainly after the fact, and it 
was often cited as if it were a moral contract that must be accomplished before the 
Occupation could end. However, as a statement of goals, it does offer some insight into 
what the United States hoped to accomplish through the Occupation. 
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I. Finances. "...(T)he United States will... aid the Haitian Government in the 
proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources 
and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a first and solid basis." (Article I) 
This was to be accomplished through the mechanism of the appointment of a General 
Receiver to collect and spend Haiti's customs duties for it. The General Receiver would 
be assisted by a Financial Advisor. (Article II) Haiti would agree that the General 
Receiver would receive all customs duties from Haiti. (Article III). The Financial 
Advisor would "collate, classify, arrange and make full statement o r all of Haiti's debts, 
to include all of their financial obligations. (Article IV) These customs duties collected 
will first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then pay off the public debt, third, 
pay for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and finally, meet the expenses of 
the Haitian Government. (Article V) Haiti could not increase its pubic debt without the 
agreement of the United States. (Article VCD) 
II. Security. Haiti agreed to an American officered and organized constabulary, 
which Haiti would pay for. (Article X) 
ID. Resources. In response to American "aid [to] the Haitian Government in the 
proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources, 
the Haitians agreed to not give or sell any of Haiti's territory (Article XI), settle all claims 
with the United States (Article XII), and develop its resources with the assistance of the 
United States. (Article XHl) 
In return, the United States agreed to help preserve Haitian independence and 
maintain a Government "adequate for the protection of life, property and individual 
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liberty." (Article XIV). The treaty was to run for ten years, and for a further ten if "for 
specific reasons presented by either of the . . . parties, the purpose of this treaty has not 
been fully accomplished." (Article XVI) Article XVI (and the Treaty extension of 1917) 
is the origin of the obligation of the United States to stay until 1936, which was 
mentioned repeatedly in debates about the Haitian Occupation in the 193 O's. 
The financial situation that the Americans found in 1915 was awful. Haiti had 
borrowed so much money that its debt service was threatening to exceed its budget. 
However, even when they were paying off their debt service, the Haitians preferred to 
take out further loans rather than cut back on current expenses. By the time the 
Occupation began, according to testimony given at the 1921-22 Senate investigations, 
Haiti was unable to borrow any more money, or pay off the debts it had already taken on. 
As was noted in Part I, World War I's effect on the World financial markets precluded a 
major consolidation loan for Haiti until 1922. However, as was presented to the Senate in 
1922, some progress had been made in reducing the debt burden in the years up to 1922 
(Annex B). Near the end of the Occupation, General Russell's annual report stated 
At the end of the fiscal year, 1928-29, the Government of Haiti had 
an unobligated cash balance of more than $4,000,000. Bonded 
indebtedness had decreased from $30,772,000 to $17,735,479, in spite of 
the contraction of new loans, 1922,1923, and 1924, totaling $22,695,000 
[the debt consolidation loans] utilized chiefly to refunded previous bonded 
indebtedness, and satisfy claims against the Government, but also to effect 
material improvements. 
Government revenues have more than doubled, chiefly through 
better collections and yields of existing taxes enabling the various 
departments of the Government to undertake the greatest program for 
public welfare the country has ever seen. Internal revenue has been 
increased, yielding over $1,200,000 during the year just finished, or more 
than one-fourth the total receipts of thirteen years ago (1915-16) and 
further important increases are forecast. A sound currency has been 
achieved. 87 
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While the Great Depression caused serious government deficits in the early 
thirties, and therefore caused the curtailment of many developmental programs, Haiti was 
still in good enough shape in 1935 to be the only one of fifteen Central and South 
American countries not to have defaulted on public dollar bonds.88 
Article X of the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty provided for an American 
organized and officered constabulary funded through Haitian customs revenue. As noted 
in Annex A, Appendix 3, it was first renamed the Garde d'Haïti in 1928 and again, after 
the Occupation, renamed the L'Armée d'Haïti. Despite its relatively small size-some 
2100 enlisted gendarmes in a country of 3.5 million—it had served Haiti, and the 
Occupation well. 
To begin with, it had replaced a pre-Occupation army "of thirty-eight (38) line and 
four (4) artillery regiments of a total paper strength of over 9,000, a Gendarmerie of over 
1,800, plus four regiments of the President's guard, the whole officered by 308 generals 
and 50 colonels, not to mention the honorary generals created by the President pro tem 
among his friends."89 In addition to being a drain on the treasury, a source of corruption, 
and a burden on the civil society (business people pressed to supply money, draft animals; 
a system of conscription more resembling impressment, etc.), the army was a constant 
threat of insurrection or coups d'état against the sitting government Michel Oreste was 
the first truly civilian president of Haiti.90 
As was shown in Part I, the Gendarmerie/Garde quickly proved a useful tool of 
the Haitian Government, even if some Occupation leaders had reservations over their use 
(viz., locking the Haitian Senate out of their chambers in 1916, closing the Haitian 
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legislature in 1917), although, admittedly, these early actions served the Occupation as 
well as the Dartiguenave presidency. The Marine Corps, as might be expected, would 
argue that the establishment and maintenance of order was generally good for Haiti.91 
Many other observers (but not all) would agree, including a British minister who had 
little other good to say about the Americans and their Occupation: "What has America 
done for Haiti in the fourteen years since the intervention? Primarily, maintained peace 
and allowed the peasant to work in safety."92 
The main shortcoming in the American institution of the Gendarmerie/Garde was 
the failure to effectively separate the militaiy function of the guard from the police 
function;93 this would have severe implications not only during the Duvalier years, but up 
through to the ouster of Aristide and the Second United States Occupation of Haiti. To 
its credit, the United States did not use the Garde as a vehicle to set up a pro-American 
military dictator such as Somoza in Nicaragua or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic; 
however, the centralized organization of the Garde and, to an extent, its professionalism, 
allowed it to be used more effectively by Duvalier and his successors.94 
In addition to its police and military functions (which included Coast Guard and 
prisons), the Gendarmerie/Garde also served as the principle builder of Haitian 
infrastructure and at one time or another built or rebuilt Haitian internal communications 
(telephone and telegraphs, roads and airfields), fire services in Port-au-Prince and 
Cap-Haïtien, traffic control as well as vehicle registration, communal administration, and 
public works construction.95 
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As noted in part 1, claims against the Haitian govemment-in excess of 70,000 
separate claims-were paid off in 1923. As far as natural resources went, Russell reported 
in 1930 that Haiti still was dependent on the coffee crop, and the coffee crop of 1928-29 
suffered from poor weather. As a means of diversification, sisal plantations were started 
on land abandoned to cultivation, a pineapple plantation and cannery started, and corn 
and other new crops started.96 However, the Depression reduced the coffee price by 40 
per cent between 1930 and 1935; logwood exports went nowhere by 1935; the pineapple 
company, rolling by 1932, was also killed by the Depression. On top of that 1935 was a 
year of severe weather. To compensate, the Haitians granted a banana monopoly to 
Standard Fruit in 1935, but nationalized it-killing the golden goose-in 1947.97 
The most serious failure of resources, as shown in Part I, was the failure to extend 
significant education to the noir peasantry. Despite the recognition of this factor in 
Sumner Well's memorandum in 1921, almost all of the significant contributions of the 
Service Technique went to the benefit of the elite, and those students rebelled when their 
allowances were cut. A more telling statistic comes from General Russell's 1930 report: 
"there are almost 400,000 children of school age and the existing schools of all types 
(including national, religious and private schools) can only accommodate slightly more 
than 100,000 students."98 The 100,000 number included all of the elite's children, the 
shortfall fell entirely upon the noir peasantry. 
American success in providing Haiti with a government "adequate for the 
protection of life, property and individual liberty," is problematical. On one hand, three 
of the four peaceful transitions of power up to the end of the Occupation occurred during 
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the Occupation. On the other, the Occupation acquiesced in Presidents Dartiguenave and 
Borno operating from the Constitution's Transitory Articles, and the closing of the Haitian 
Senate in 1916 and the Chamber of Deputies in 1917, until Roy took office and 
legislative elections were held in October 1930. 
The constitution itself, written in Haiti, modified by the US State Department and 
thrown to a national referendum when it appeared the Chamber of Deputies would not 
approve it, has been criticized on a number of issues, most notably the provision, new in 
1918, allowing foreigners to own property (particularly land) in Haiti." However, a 
major area of disagreement between the United States and the Haitian governments in 
1922 was a Haitian law "interpreting" this constitutional provision in such a way that the 
article was all but nullified.100 It is also interesting to note that neither the amendments to 
that constitution passed during President Borno's administration in 1927, nor the 1932 
constitution written during the Haitianization period removed this provision.101 
Imperialism and Racism 
As noted above, the United States Occupation of Haiti in 1915 to 1934 has been 
accused of both imperialism (or colonialism) and racism. Both charges have a bearing on 
an analysis of the Occupation and need to be addressed. Of the two, imperialism 
probably rates the shorter answer. 
If Imperialism (or colonialism) is the long-term taking over of a country or region 
for the purpose of economic exploitation, then the Occupation, however dubious its 
status in international law of the time or by political standards of the end of the 20th 
Century, was not Imperialism. The period of the Occupation was fixed by Treaty, 
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however ex post facto it may have been, and American officials appear to have had every 
intention of abiding by its limits. In any case, as discussed in Part I, other factors 
prevented the US Occupation from reaching its stated treaty limit of 1936. 
Another line of investigation that could be followed is the opportunities the 
Occupation gave the United States business community in Haiti. It is true that the 
German business community was for all intents and purposes shut down in Haiti in 
1917-18, but that was more due to war paranoia than to present an opening to the United 
States business community.102 Franklin Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
and John Mcllhenny, then financial Advisor to Haiti, apparently sought out some sort of 
financial investments in Haiti in the 1917-19 time frame, assisted by Roosevelt's cousin 
Harry, who was serving with the Gendarmerie at the time. Although apparently nothing 
came to fruition, it was a surprising breach of government ethics, even for 1917.103 Other 
investment opportunities simply did not materialize. Both Standard Oil and the United 
Fruit Company declined to invest in Haiti at the time because of State Department 
investment regulations. 
However, with the United States controlling Haitian customs, it was apparently 
easy to abrogate an 1907 Franco-Haitian commercial convention, to favor American 
imports. The National City Bank did float the Series A, B, and C loans for Haiti in 
1922-23, and the Banque Nationale was by then a subsidiary of the National City Bank, 
from which the bank profited.104 However, the National City Bank was induced to sell 
out its interest to Haiti for a mere $1 million in 1936, when President Vincent 
nationalized the Banque™5 
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Perhaps the most critical evaluation that might honestly be made of the 
Occupation is that: 
[it] was a matter of US self-interest. It was not principally and 
exclusively a philanthropic act because after US troops landed in Haiti, it 
took much pressure from local dissidents and American sympathizers to 
force the occupation troops to withdraw (Weatherly [U. G., Haiti: An 
Experiment in Pragmatism. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, 
No. 3 (1926), pp. 353-66], 1926: 354). The public statements made by the 
White House and the State Department that the United States came to 
rescue a friendly neighbor in trouble were purely whitewashing 
propaganda created for international and national consumption (Buell [R. 
L. The American Occupation of Haiti (New York: Foreign Policy 
Association, 1929), 1929: 341). The occupation was instead a strict 
application of the Monroe Doctrine that viewed the Caribbean as mare 
nostrum.106 
Racism is a much more difficult issue to address, particularly because of what one 
author called "the American racial mores of the day"107 have changed so dramatically 
since 1915. Nevertheless, the case that the Americans conducted their Occupation with 
severe racial prejudices is based on three basic arguments or sets of evidence: language 
used by the Americans, testimony of racial prejudice by Haitian citizens, and an 
allegation that Marine Corps policy deliberately selected Southerners for duty in Haiti, 
"because they can handle Negroes." 
The chief villain in the racist language argument is Colonel (later Major General) 
Littleton W. T. Waller, USMC (1856-1926). As the first commander of the Marine 
Brigade pacifying and garrisoning Haiti, he might be expected to have set a tone for the 
conduct of the Occupation. Waller was of the old Marine Corps, when it was referred to 
as America's "colonial infantry." He was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, served 
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in the Boxer Rebellion, commanded the Marine Battalion on Samar, and commanded 
brigades in interventions in Cuba and Mexico before the landing in Haiti-
Colonel Waller was born into a slave-holding family in Virginia before the Civil 
War, a family who lost eleven members, ten of them children, in the Nat Turner Slave 
Rebellion in 1831,108 Waller was also infamous as the "Butcher of Samar." In January 
1902, while commanding the Marine Battalion (as was customary in those days, the 
battalion was provisional and otherwise undesignated), Waller allegedly ordered the 
murder of eleven natives on Samar, one of a number of atrocity cases that arose out of the 
Philippine Insurrection. Waller was court-martialed for murder in March 1902 and was 
eventually acquitted.109 
Writing Colonel (later Major-General Commandant) John A. Lejeune, then 
Assistant to the Major-General Commandant of the Marine Corps, in October 1915, 
Waller remarked, "you can never trust a nigger with a gun." Hans Schmidt quotes this 
remark twice in his The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 and once in 
Maverick Marine, a biography of Smedley Butler, in building his case on the role of 
American racism in the Occupation of Haiti.110 Elizabeth Abbott, in Haiti: The 
Duvaliers and Their Legacy, uses the phrase to characterize the entire US Occupation.111 
Waller probably was a racist-given his background and history this is probably an 
unremarkable conclusion—and, as Schmidt makes his case in both US 
Occupation—quoting Waller liberally—and Maverick Marine, this was certainly the 
manner in which Waller spoke on a regular basis.112 
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However, on occasion, Waller rose above his racist prejudices: recall from Part I 
his disagreement with shutting down the Haitian Senate even when it would serve 
immediate Occupation objectives as well as Haitian President Dartiguenave's. Waller 
was also ready to counsel his protégé Smedley Butler on curbing his behavior towards the 
elite: "There is more harm done by such an act than can be remedied by months of work 
and labor."113 Another point to remember is that Colonel Waller commanded 1st 
Provisional Brigade of Marines for only 15 months (Annex A, Appendix 1), and was 
senior American officer present (after Caperton's departure for Santo Domingo) only 
from May to November 1916. 
A much more appropriate person for scrutiny would be John H. Russell, twice 
brigade commander of 1st Brigade and United States High Commissioner from 1922 to 
1930. If any officer's personal prejudices had a significant influence on United States 
policy in Haiti, it would be his. Yet, to many observers, General Russell, who spoke 
4 
rather good French, was decidedly not a racist A Haitian who had no shortage of critical 
remarks about the Occupation, B. Danache, who once called Waller and Butler "torturers 
without scruple," had kind words for both General and Mrs. Russell.114 Even critics of 
the Occupation note that General Russell "pursued a policy designed to eliminate racial 
friction."115 
Finally, as we discuss language, we must acknowledge that what constitutes 
permissible language in racial, sexual, or any other context, changes as society evolves. 
Insensitive, even brutal, racial characterizations colored the language of many white 
Americans, and not just Southerners or racists, in the early part of this century, which is 
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why use of language is so inaccurate a gauge of racism. Even Smedley Butler-whose use 
of crude racial characterizations is well documented—and his wife are seen by a critic of 
the Occupation as "perhaps relatively liberal, and at least made an effort to be polite and 
gracious."116 
However we characterize the official racial tone of the Occupation, it was 
certainly seen by at least part of the Haitian population as racist. This segment was the 
elite, particularly the mulätres. As they were the literate class in Haiti, their opinion is the 
one on the written record. As they spoke French, and many spoke English before the 
Occupation was through, they were the Haitians that outsiders—supporters of the 
Occupation as well as critics—sought out to talk to. And the elite did not mince words: 
"The Americans have taught us many things," Le Nouvelliste 
[Port-au-Prince] newspaper owner Ernest Chauvet told author Seabrook 
[author of The Magic Island, 1929]. "Among other things they have 
taught us that we are niggers. You see, we really didn't know that before. 
We thought we were negroes."117 
The problem with this position is that, despite elite perceptions otherwise, most 
Americans appear to have had separate opinions of the elite and the noir peasantry, the 
former rather negative, the latter rather positive. One of the more noted of these separate 
characterizations is from Smedley Butler's testimony before the Senate investigating 
committee in 1921: 
The Haitian people are divided into two classes; one class wears shoes and 
the other does not... Those that wear shoes I took as a joke... They 
wore cut-away coats, brass-head canes, stove-pipe hats 3 inches in 
diameter, and anything else they could put on to make themselves 
conspicuous. But the people who were barefooted, the women wearing 
themselves hubbards and the men dungarees half-way up to their knees, 
with scarred feet, indicating the hardest kind of toil, and with great blisters 
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on their hands, and with the palms of their hands as hard as a piece of sole 
leather—those people you could absolutely trust.118 
Other famous Marines besides Smedley Butler served in Haiti, particularly in the 
early years, and some of their memoirs echo Butler's characterization of the two classes 
in Haiti: A. A. Vandergrift, who served twice in Haiti, once as Butler's adjutant, and was 
later Commandant of the Marine Corps119, or Frederick M. "Dopey" Wise, another double 
veteran of Haiti and Chef of the Gendarmerie d'haïti from July 1919 to January 1921.120 
Memoirs of enlisted Marines with Haitian service are more rare, but best known of these, 
The White King of La Gonäve, by Marine Sergeant and Gendarmerie Lieutenant Faustin 
Wirkus, may not offer the colorful parallels of Butler, but the general comparisons in his 
book are much the same.121 Former Brigade commanders Eli Cole and Russell also have 
been quoted in similar statements showing favor towards the peasantry and distrust 
towards the elite.322 
To some writers, the Marine and American attitude towards the elite constitutes 
racism; I read mostly contempt for a parasitic level of society. Even Hans Schmidt, the 
most quoted writer of the racist analysis of the Occupation, in building his case, comes 
close to recognizing this contempt: 
The cultural clash between Americans and the Haitian elite was all 
the more exacerbated because the Americans, who subscribed to political 
ideologies of democracy and egalitarianism, were repulsed by the very 
concept of elitism and that was fundamental to the social and economic 
position of the elite in Haiti. This revulsion, of course, ignored the 
paradox of American racial and cultural elitism. During the early years of 
the occupation American military commanders were especially trenchant 
in this respect, scorning the aristocratic pomposity of the elite while 
expressing affection for the common people. This attitude was firmly 
rooted in ideals of democratic egalitarianism.. .123 
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How the actual peasant noir felt about this American attitude comes to us only 
second hand, the old peasant quoted in Abbott's Haiti (fit 91), for instance. Other 
interpretations come to us filtered through one political view or another, such as the 
anti-Occupation Occupied Haiti (1927) by Emily Balch: 
It may be true that the peasants in general like the Occupation. It is 
possible that they are sufficiently conscious of the benefits that have come 
with it, and ascribe them sufficiently clearly to the Americans. One is told 
that they now build their houses on the roadside as they did not dare to do 
in the old days, for fear of being seized by some revolutionary enterprise 
or to serve as soldiers. Again this story is laughed at, and one is told the 
houses always stood as they do now. 
It is hard to believe that given the deep-seated traditional belief that 
the return of the white men spelled a return of slavery, and given the land 
situation, the peasants do not feel uneasy under their new white masters.124 
However, there was no mistaking how the elite felt: Americans had not 
understood: 
the social experiment [that was Haiti, nothing] that calls for shame or 
concealment... [Tjhey throw the history of Haiti in our face—its long 
tissue of revolutions and massacres Efforts to help the masses have 
been made again and again and in many ways,... The American 
invasion might have been a good thing if, although unjust and even 
infringing for a time upon our independence, it had been temporary and 
had led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But such is not the 
case 
"Even the good that they do turns to our hurt, for instead of 
teaching us, they do it to prove that we are incapable. They are exploiters. 
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But if the Americans had contempt for the elite, the elite returned it in kind: 
"But it is a grand joke, isn't it?" Chauvet continued. The sergeant's 
wife or the captain's, who maybe did her own washing at home, is our 
social superior and would feel herself disgraced to shake hands with any 
nigger. Why, many of those white Marine Corps people couldn't have 
entered my mulatto father's house except by the servants' entrance."126 
Haitian civil courts never were controlled by the Occupation and were also 
perceived as anti-white and anti-American: "though a black foreigner might win his case 
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against a Haitian, a white man stood little chance and a white American none at all."127 
Most curious-to me at least-is the Haitian elite's scorn towards American Blacks, whom 
they considered servile. In 1924, the Haitian ambassador in Washington informed the 
State Department that even the noirs looked down on American Blacks [something I 
doubt, as relatively few noirs then lived in the cities and larger towns where they would 
have come in contact with them]. This had serious impact on American representation in 
Haiti which, since the end of the 19th Century, had been largely Black, a small legion 
which had included Ambassadors (ministers) Frederick Douglass (1889-91) and Dr. H. 
W. Furniss (1905-1913), and CPT Charles Young, 9th Cavalry, USA, the first flack 
American military attaché and the first military attaché assigned to Haiti. As a result, the 
President was forced to appoint White diplomats to Haiti rather than the Black 
Republicans he had wanted to reward.128 
Balch repeats the elite's accusation-repeated in turn by Schmidt (less the 
prostitution) and Abbott, that the Occupation brought about the hereto unknown 
phenomenon of public intoxication and prostitution.129 Other sources confirm the public 
intoxication—as it was the Prohibition period back in the United States, Americans 
tended to take advantage of being out of the United States in that regard (much to the 
disapproval of the British, incidentally).130 As of yet, other sources do not confirm the 
prostitution charge. 
While I do not doubt that many an individual American was a racist, or at the least 
used language with nasty racial characterizations, it must be remembered that this 
behavior is being reported by a class of people who have been displaced from positions of 
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power or influence and, in many cases, income by the Occupation. The elite also feared 
rising American influence-to their disadvantage-among the noirs. This was the same 
class, through various patriotic organizations, which fed atrocity stories back to the 
Nation and other periodicals in 1919-1922, many of which were found to be exaggerated 
or without basis in fact. (Part I) Therefore, the magnitude of the reports-not the 
existence of prejudicial behavior—must be taken with several grains of salt. 
For more than 30 years, various writers and periodicals such as Harry Franck in 
Roaming Through the West Indies (1920),131The New York Times (1920),132 Balch 
(1927),133 James Leyburn in The Haitian People (1941),134 Seiden Rodman in Haiti: The 
Black Republic, The Complete Story and Guide (1954),135 and even Time magazine 
(1954)136 repeated as fact or alluded to a Marine Corps policy that had recruited Southern 
officers for service in Haiti "because they can handle blacks." (Colonel Waller, true to 
form, had made a similar statement about his qualifications in a letter to Lejeune in 
1916.137) 
The truth of the matter is that no such policy existed. In 1964, an analysis by a 
history student in Wellesley College, followed up by both critics and supporters of the 
Occupation-both academic and Marine—shows, statistically, that the charge is inaccurate. 
In fact, as shown in Table 1, the proportion of Southern officers to the total number of 
Marine officers serving in Haiti varies randomly from year to year, the lack of a pattern or 
of a fixed proportion of officers being Southern strongly suggests the lack of a policy in 
such a matter. In addition, no one has found any documentary evidence, or personal 
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Table IS Southerners in the Population 
Southern 
Marine Marines Southern Southern Marines 
Year U. S. Population' Population2 in Haiti3 Population4 Marines* in Haiti6 
1910 92,228,531 24.28 
1916 328 77 22.56 19.48 
1917 372 72 24.73 31.94 
1918 
1919 1767 59 20.43 28.81 
1920 106,021,431 1098 80 23.78 22.67 22.5 
1921 976 75 22.54 22.66 
1922 1028 88 20.82 21.59 
1923 1043 118 21.57 20.34 
1924 1067 . 109 21.56 18.35 
1925 1101 119 22.16 18.49 
1926 1094 94 2221 29.79 
1927 1121 97 21.23 24.74 
1928 1185 90 20.84 26.67 
1929 1173 80 20.72 30 
1930 122.906,848 1180 88 23.44 20.51 23.86 
1931 1183 87 19.7 17.24 
1932 1173 77 20.03 15.58 
1940 132,165,131 24.06 
1 Includes total United States population for the 50 states only. 
2 Includes total population of commissioned and warrant officers of the U.S. Marine Corps, only if born in one of what 
are now the 50 states. 
3 
Includes all United States born commissioned and warrant officers in the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Haiti. 
4 The percentage of U.S. population born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. 
5 The percentage of Marine Corps Officers born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. 
6 The percentage of Marine Corps officers in Haiti bom in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Geoigia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. 
Source: Ann Hurst Harrington.131 
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recollection, that any such policy existed, either for First Brigade or the Gendarmerie. 
Ironically, while the majority of Marine officers serving in Haiti were not Southern, many 
of President Wilson's appointees were. Except for the possible exception of John 
Mcllhenny, who had regrettable personal relations with President Dartiguenave, most of 
these men acquitted themselves well.139 
Analysis of the racial situation, based on all of the above, is of an Occupation that 
had no officially racist policy, perhaps even one discouraging racist behavior and word 
during the Russell years, yet due to the racist attitudes of individuals—both American and 
the Haitian elite—the general social climate in Haiti's cities was, at times, very racially 
charged. However, amongst the noirs in the countryside, those Americans who had 
regular contact with them through the Gendarmerie and other means, with exceptions, 
generally shared feelings of affection and mutual respect for the people with whom they 
were in contact. 
Culture 
In 1930, President Hoover's Forbes Commission, amongst its findings, included 
"The failure of the Occupation to understand the social problems of Haiti, its brusque 
attempt to plant democracy there by drill and harrow, its determination to set up a middle 
class—however wise and necessary it may seem to Americans—all these explain why, in 
part, the high hopes of our good works in this land have not been realized."140 This is 
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probably the major failing of the Occupation, and when one wonders why the effects of 
the Occupation were so short lived, this is why. The Occupation addressed problems and 
applied solutions that simply did not apply to Haiti. 
One must remember that for the bulk of its first century of freedom, Haiti was an 
isolated country, partially because the United States wanted little contact with a free 
Black country, and partially because the Haitians wanted the blancs to have no excuse to 
reestablish slavery. This led to a peculiarly insular Haitian society and a peculiarly 
Haitian method of transferring power and governing the country. It had also been a poor 
country for all of its history since independence, and this led to intense competition for 
the riches of the country. This fed a competition for power in Haiti, for it was those in 
power who disbursed the riches. 
Initially, the elite-made up of the mulätres descended from the French 
colonialists—had the easiest access to power through education, social position and 
birthright. For the noir, the route to power led through the military, and by the beginning 
of the 20th Century this had become so routine that American officers observed that 
"there is a regular procedure in this warfare" that one Senator likened to American 
elections.141 A ritual battle would be fought near the town of Saint-Marc, and the 
challenger to the Presidency, if he won, marched on Port-au-Prince, and was voted into 
the Presidency. In most cases, the new President then disbursed the spoils of his victory 
until challenged by a new power. The military noirs thus became part of the elite. 
Through all this squabbling for power, the peasantry, exclusively noir, stood by, 
struggling to provide a living for themselves and their families, and, if they participated 
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Table V Haiti's rulers since Independence 
Ruled Fate 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines 1804-06 shot 
Henry Christophe ("King" of Northern Haiti) 1807-20 suicide 
Alexandre Pétion 1807-18 died of illness 
Jean-Pierre Boyer 1818-43 fled to France 
Charlés Hérard 1843-44 fled 
Philippe Guerrier 1844-45 died of old age 
Jean-Louis Pierrot 1845-46 unknown 
Jean-Baptise Riché 1846-47 unknown 
Faustin Soulouque 1847-59 fled to Jamaica 
Fabre GefFard 1859-67 fled to Jamaica 
Sylvain Salnave 1867-69 executed 
Nissage Saget 1870-74 retired 
Michel Domingue 1874-76 fled to Jamaica 
Boisrond Canal 1876-79 fled to Jamaica 
Félicité Salomon 1879-88 fled to France 
Florvil Hyppolite 1889-96 apoplexy 
Tirésias Simon Sam 1896-1902 fled 
Nord Alexis 1902-08 fled to Jamaica 
Antoine Simon 1908-11 fled to Jamaica 
Cincinnatus Leconte 1911-12 blown up 
Tancrtde Auguste 1912-13 poisoned 
Michel Oreste 1913-14 fled to Jamaica 
Oreste Zamor 1914 murdered in jail 
Davilmar Théodore 1914-15 fled 
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam 1915 dismembered 
American occupation 1915-1934 
Sténio Vincent 1930-41 resigned 
Elie Lescot 1941-46 fled to Florida 
Dumarsais Estimé 1946-50 overthrown 
Paul Magloire 1950-56 overthrown 
Nemours Pierre-Louis 1956-57 resigned 
Franck Sylvain 1957 overthrown 
Daniel Fignolé 1957 overthrown 
Francis Duvalier 1957-71 died of illness 
Jean-Claude Duvalier 1971-86 fled to France 
Henri Namphy 1986-88 stepped down 
Leslie Manigat 1988 overthrown 
Henri Namphy 1988 overthrown 
Prosper Avril 1988-90 fled 
Ertha Pascal-Trouillot 1990 taken hostage, freed, 
ceeded power peacefully. 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide 1991 fled to America 
Cédras junta 1991-94 thrown out 
American occupation 1994-1995 
Jean-Bertrand Aristride 1994-1996 Peacefully ceeded power 
René Préval 1996-2001 
Source: The Economist, updated, Written in Blood, 2nd Edition542 
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in the process at all, it was in being exploited or killed. It was this situation the 
Americans sought to change through the imposition of a new constitution and the orderly 
installation of several Presidents. The class of Haitians who temporarily lost power and 
income through this process~the elite-resisted. Many of the American reforms were in 
the long-run essentially pointless. Putting Haitian finances to rights and restoring their 
credit, on which a great deal of effort was eventually expended (Annex B), was of little 
interest to the elite. These accounts had never been that important to them, except as a 
source of graft. Increased credit meant nothing more than increased opportunity for 
future graft. 
An improved Gendarmerie, intended as a source of public order during the 
Occupation, was, after the Occupation, quickly politicized and became an efficient tool 
for forcing the transfer of power. It was much more efficient than the corruption-plagued 
pre-Occupation Haitian Army that had so lost any efficiency that private armies—the 
Cacos—had become more effective in forcing the transfer of power. 
Improved agriculture techniques and education for the noir peasantry were 
resisted by the elite because anything that enfranchised the peasantry increased the 
competition for the power and the riches. However, many peasants resisted agricultural 
reforms simply because they were new and untried in Haiti, and in many cases they were 
right in resisting inappropriate agricultural methods. Improved medical facilities for the 
peasantry were only a source of plunder for the elite;143 the elite had their own hospitals 
and doctors. 
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One glaring example of the American inability to grasp the Haitian culture was 
the Occupation's allowing the Borno presidency to use the Gendarmerie to persecute 
practitioners of Voodoo. The Americans were persuaded that Voodoo was witchcraft,144 
even though individual Americans, serving with the Gendarmerie for example, were 
perfectly capable of understanding Voodoo's role as a religion.145 
In some ways, those who accuse the Americans of racism have a point: many of 
the American administrators-Marine and civilian—were incapable of understanding that 
Haitians were a culture completely different from the Black culture that they had been 
accustomed to in the United States and thought they knew; witness Colonel Wise 
complaining about "one of those American Treaty Officials arrived with a book entitled 
'The Development of the Negro Mind,' from which he quoted on all occasions!"146 
Despite all the good intentions, despite the years of hard work, despite the lives 
lost or ruined, the Occupation failed to have a lasting impact on Haiti (except perhaps in 
legend), because the areas the Occupation sought to improve were not those areas that 
would fundamentally alter Haitian society. 
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Part III 
The Never-ending Story 
Based on my research on the First Occupation,without going into the Duvaliers 
and what led to the Second United States Occupation of Haiti, some observations about 
the fall of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Second Occupation, and the recent turn-over of the 
pacification effort to the United Nations, are offered. 
The military coup that overthrew Aristide was nothing special in Haitian politics. 
United States political actors and events made it so. While the election that brought 
Aristide to power was democratic, it does not mean that Haiti was a democratic country 
subsequently overthrown by a military coup. The elections were simply a new means of 
seizing power, and therefore the riches, in Haiti, and was probably viewed by the 
elite-and Aristide—as no more valid, or less valid, a method than marching on 
Port-au-Prince at the head of a Caco army. 
Haiti is a more violent country than it was prior to the First Occupation. Part of 
this is because the Duvaliers politicized the noir peasantry more than their predecessors, 
part of this is the increasingly desperate condition of the peasantry, and those seizing 
power must either organize them or suppress them. Aristide organized the peasantry, 
Cédras suppressed them. It is still all part of the struggle for power in Haiti. 
Aristide was able to bring a new player into the struggle for power in Haiti—the 
United States, acting this time as an agent for Aristide as well as itself. The departure of 
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the United States, particularly if the United Nations is unable to maintain order, will 
simply renew the struggle for power. 
Change to a different political system will not occur in Haiti unless either the 
culture of seizing political power and therefore riches changes, or one of the parties 
departs the scene. Neither seems likely. Absent Aristide, the elite—still mulätre although 
with a strong noir, component—will resume the struggle for power and riches amongst 
itself. 
The noir peasantry, who a hundred years ago fled to the hills to escape oppression 
or exploitation, however, now has nowhere to go. The lush forests that Smedley Butler 
fought through are largely gone for lumber, fuel, or charcoal. Charcoal is often the only 
cash crop to which the noir peasantry has access. Forests, which covered about 60 per 
cent of Haiti in 1923, now cover only 3 per cent. The coffee trees, that provided the crop 
that John Russell and his advisors were so worried about Haitian dependence on, have 
gone for charcoal with the most recent U. S. embargo. The farmland, of which originally 
only 11 percent of the country was even considered suitable, has mostly washed away, no 
longer held to the ground by the trees.147 
The chances for Haitian migration are largely gone. These is probably little more 
room in the Dominican Republic for any more illegal workers; Cuba has not been a 
source of employment even before Castro came to power, the United States cut off illegal 
migrations during the Aristide crisis. 
Given the lack of real political reform in Haiti (Aristide did turn over the 
Presidency in 1996, but the turmoil over the recent parlimentary elections, makes it 
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appear that he will resume power in 2001-freely elected, probably-and perhaps this time 
will keep it); given the destruction of the Haitian economy-which the American embargo 
hastened, but didn't cause; given the prospects for no end to the oppression of the noir 




Annex A: The US Marine Corps' Military Campaigns in the First United States 
Occupation of Haiti 
The day after the mob attacked Guillaume Sam and dragged his body through the 
streets, Admiral Caperton landed troops to restore order.148 
Under command of Capt. George Van Orden, USMC, the Cruiser Squadron 
Marine Officer, a two-battalion landing force composed of three companies of seamen, 
12th Company of Marines (earlier detached from 2nd Regiment), and the Marine 
detachment from the Washington, was landed at 5:45 P. M., a force of probably no more 
than 500 men. After landing at Bizoton, west of Port-au-Prince, and marching on the 
capital, the landing force cleared the streets from the harbor to the foreign legations and 
established guards there. The 12th Company furnished most of the guards, while the 
remainder of the landing force bivouacked in front of the present-day National Palace.149 
The 24th Company, transported from Guanténamo Bay, Cuba, reinforced the landing 
force the following day.150 
Caperton radioed for a regiment of Marines on the 28th.151 Col. John A. Lejeune, 
Assistant to the Commandant and, in the temporary absence of the Major General 
Commandant, Acting Commandant, detached the 2nd Regiment from the Advance 
BaseBrigade in Philadelphia and dispatched it to Haiti aboard the battleship USS 
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Connecticut (BB-18) within 24 hours of notification. In his memoirs, Lejeune stated that 
the necessary arrangements took an hour to accomplish over the phone. A week later, 
Caperton requested further reinforcements and Lejeune dispatched 1st Regiment on the 
armored cruiser USS Tennessee (CA-10) (often reported as a battleship, even in 
contemporary sources) as the requested reinforcements, and the Advance Base Brigade 
headquarters under Col. Littleton W. T. Waller to take charge. Admiral Caperton would 
be the senior American officer present in Haiti, Col. Waller became the senior American 
officer ashore.152 
Second Regiment, commanded by Colonel Eli Cole, landed at Port-au-Prince on 4 
August 1915. The next day, Col. Cole, 2nd Regiment, and the Washington landing party 
persuaded the Haitian commander of Fort National, Port-au-Prince, to surrender his 
command to the Marines. Fourteen cannon, 450 rifles, and a million rounds of 
ammunition were captured with the Fort. The garrison and other Haitian troops in 
Port-au-Prince were detained for a time at the old Dessaline Barracks.153 On 8 August, 
the Haitian gunboat Nord Alexis arrived at Port-au-Prince from Cap-Haïtien, with 766 
Haitian soldiers to be demobilized by Marines. After putting 30 of the most destitute into 
the hospital, the Marines paid off the remainder at 10 gourdes (about $2.00) a head. The 
soldiers were apparently quite delighted at the deal (Caperton described them later as 
destitute and with nothing to eat) and apparently happy to go, although some thought they 
had to bribe their way out of the Navy Yard, and offered some of their bounty to the 
Marine sentries.154 
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First Regiment (Col. Theodore P. Kane), Colonel Waller, a signal company and 
Headquarters, 1st Brigade arrived in Port-au-Prince on 15 August 1915. Colonel Cole 
took command of First Regiment (Col. Kane took over Second Regiment) and took it to 
Cap-Haïtien, landing about 18 August. The Artillery Battalion (at the time the only 
artillery battalion organized as such in the Marine Corps), equipped with 12 3-inch 
landing guns and two 4.7-inch heavy field guns were landed on 31 August after a return 
trip to the United States by the USS Tennessee,155 Col. Waller's campaign guidance was 
written by Admiral Caperton. Martial law was proclaimed by Admiral Caperton in 
Port-au- rince and vicinity on 3 September 1915.156 
In accordance with Admiral Caperton's instructions to Colonel Waller, 2nd 
Regiment secured Port-au-Prince and its environs, while Colonel Cole and 1st Regiment 
occupied Cap-Haïtien on the northern coast. After initial expectations of an attack on 
Cap-Haïtien from the local Caco bands did not materialize, local patrolling began. The 
landing of the USS Connecticut battalion (composed of seamen equipped as infantry), 
allowed Colonel Cole to send 19th Company by sea to Port-de-Paix on 24 August as the 
first step in spreading control along the northern coast. A military government was 
proclaimed in Cap-Haïtien under Colonel Cole on 1 September 1915.157 
At this time, Major Smedley D. Butler, commander of 1st Battalion, 1st 
Regiment, reported on various operations to both, or either, Colonel Cole, his regimental 
commander, and Colonel Waller, the brigade commander. On one such operation, 
reporting to Colonel Waller, Butler and his adjutant, First Lieutenant A. A. Vandergrift, 
took ship to Gonaïves, where Butler took command of a tiny ad hoc battalion consisting 
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of 7th Company and the Marine detachment of the USS Castine.(?G-6\ a total of five 
officers and 104 Marines, counting Butler and Vandergrift. Butler's mission was to open 
the rail line (which no longer exists) to the interior town of Ennery, approximately 30 
kilometers inland. 
Butler's problem was a Caco chief named Rameau, a "General, in command of a 
rabble of thieves and vagabonds, squatting in the surrounding bushes," whom he notified, 
when he arrived in Gonaïves on 20 September 1915, that he would not tolerate any 
interference with the rail line or with the food supply for Gonaïves. He also told Rameau, 
through the American consul, that he wanted to meet with him to give him the warning in 
person. Before the meeting could come off, however, Butler and several squads from 7th 
Company were off chasing Cacos who had been burning the rail line. By the time he 
returned to Gonaïves, 24 hours later, Butler had chased the Cacos out of their 
headquarters in a small town named Poteaux, and had a chance to warn Rameau in 
person. Rameau led about 450 Cacos, who, according to Butler's report to Waller, "not 
half of whom had serviceable rifles." Rameau came into Gonaïves the following 
morning, the 22nd, and met with Butler, who repeated his warning, and offered Rameau 
money for his guns and men. 
The morning of the 23rd, Butler and sixty Marines boarded a small train for 
Ennery. The major problems encountered on the trip were those repairing the damage 
caused by the Cacos, and it was 9:30 at night before the train reached Ennery. After hasty 
repairs to the locomotive, the Marines headed back to Gonaïves, stopping briefly at 
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Poteaux to discover that Rameau and his men "had left for their homes the morning [sic] 
and that all was quiet."158 
Major Butler returned to the north on 9 October, landing from the USS Nashville 
(PG-7) at Fort-Liberté with 15th Company, 2nd Regiment and several attached officers 
from the 11th Company. At the same time, reinforced elements of 13th Company 
occupied Grande-Rivière from Cap-Haïtien. Butler expanded his operating area south to 
Ouanaminthe, routing Cacos out of several old French forts used as bases in the area.159 
At the same time, Colonel Waller was diplomatically disarming the old Haitian 
army-about 750 from Fort-Liberté and Ouanaminthe. He also tried to bring in several 
Caco chiefs in the same manner.160 The problem was that not all the Caco chiefs were 
willing to sign agreements with Waller nor be bought off. 
First Regiment was now in position to finish the war with the Cacos. Using 
Major Butler's battalion and elements of the USS Connecticut battalion, under Butler's 
command, the Marines were in position by the end of October 1915 to remove Caco 
bases and forts from the north country and the border area with the Dominican Republic. 
In a campaign that stretched from 9 October to 27 November 1915, Butler, at times 
working with 5th, 11th, 13th, and 23rd Companies as well as the 15th, plus the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th Connecticut companies, destroyed four Caco camps and seven old French forts 
used as bases by the Cacos, destroyed 122 rifles, and reported 21 Cacos killed and at 
least 10 wounded.161 An assault by Lt Edward A. Ostermann and six Marines of 15th 
Company seized old Fort*Dipitié from about two dozen Cacos on the night of 24 October 
1915.162 The campaign culminated in an assault on old Fort-Rivière under the cover of 
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automatic rifles and machine guns and its capture after hand to hand fighting. A ton of 
dynamite was carried by mules to the Fort to destroy it after its capture. While Butler did 
not report Caco casualties in the Fort-Rivière assault, others present reported at least 30 
Cacos dead.163 Other sources quote 50 dead Cacos. In any case, Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels telegraphed Caperton halting further operations. The campaign was 
over anyway.164 Second Regiment, besides garrisoning and controlling Port-au-prince, 
apparently secured the southern peninsula of Haiti through vigorous patrolling and 
avoided the sharp actions 1st Regiment experienced with the Cacos.165 
Three enlisted men were reported killed in the initial occupation of Haiti and one 
officer and 13 enlisted wounded.166 Two officers and three enlisted men were awarded 
Medals of Honor for valor in the campaign.167 
Nineteen Sixteen saw a shift in the Marine forces in Haiti and in Santo Domingo 
(now the Dominican Republic), its neighbor on the island of Hispaniola. Various 
companies from 1st and 2nd Regiments were dispatched to the Dominican Republic 
during 1916. In April, in a move to rationalize the chain of command, all units in the 
Dominican Republic were subordinated to 1st Regiment, 2nd Provisional Brigade of 
Marines; and all units in Haiti were subordinated to 2nd Regiment, 1st Provisional 
Brigade of Marines. Second Regiment from this point on represented all or most of the 
"muscle" for 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines.168 First Marine Brigade settled into a 
normal garrison routine.169 
Building on resentments over the corvée, an impressed labor system, a Caco 
general named Charlemagne Péralte started a revolt in October 1918. Initially, the new 
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Gendarmerie held off the rebels, but eventually they had to ask for help. First Marine 
Brigade was in a low strength period-barely battalion strength by World War II 
standards~but pitched in the defense of Port-au-Prince and participated in the aggressive 
patrolling of the north country and the Artibonite region that followed, 
himself was finally killed in 1919 by Marine Sergeants Herman H. Hanneken and 
William R. Button-attached to the Gendarmerie as Gendamerie Lieutenants—leading a 
patrol of 20 Gendarmes in what amounted to a Special Operation170. The rebellion 
lingered on in the Artibonite region, led by Benoit Batraville, and included a second 
assault on Port-au-prince, before Batraville and his followers were hunted down in the 
border country and killed in May 1920. After the death of Batraville, most organized 
resistance from the Cacos ceased, although scattered outlaws, as they were often 
characterized, were skirmished with and captured up to the end of 1921. The campaign 
required the enlargement of the 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines by 50%, and saw its 
first deployment of aircraft.171 
The routine of 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines after the Caco revolt soon 
enough returned to the norms of Caribbean garrison life.172 The strength of the 1 st 
Brigade gradually waned to half that of a modem infantry battalion as commitments in 
more important areas drew away troops and resources from Haiti, reflecting service 
realities in a H,tween-wars" Marine Corps hard pressed for resources (see Appendix 1). 
Throughout its service in Haiti, 1st Brigade endured incredible personnel and 
command turmoil. As can be seen in Appendix 1, there were 18 brigade commanders in 
19 years. Second Regiment had 22 commanders in the same period. Eighth Regiment 
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had nine commanders in six years. Even allowing for the detachment of 1 st Regiment to 
Dominica in early 1916, only two of six original companies of Marines were present in 
mid-1917, joined by five new companies. Two years later, as the Caco revolt heated up, 
six new companies were added, and 8th Regiment was formed by the end of the year. 
However, by the mid-1920s, both regiments were ghosts of their former selves and 8th 
Regiment was deactivated 31 June 1925. That the Brigade was able to quickly respond to 
the corvée crisis in 1919, to replace Gendarmes in the Hinche-Maïr j cd ? region, and then 
to lend effective support to the Gendarmerie during the early months of the Caco revolt 
appears, at this distance, to be little short of miraculous. That the Brigade was able to 
maintain its professionalism, training, and discipline—most of the atrocity allegations in 
1919-21 were of Marines serving as Gendarmerie officers—is a tribute to the inherent 
strengths of the Marine Corps in those lean years between the World Wars. 
The 1st Brigade played a very limited role in the civil disturbances in 
October-December 1929. The sole "combat", if it can be called that, was the so-called 
"Les Cayes Massacre" when a section of Marines, defending themselves against a mob of 
some 1500, killed 12 and wounded another 23 rioters.173 
Department of State 
August 15,1934 
Statement by the Secretary of State 
Haiti: 
Today the withdrawal of our Marine and naval forces from Haiti is being 
completed. Under an agreement between the two Governments of August 
7, 1933, the Haitian Garde, which has been trained and partly officered by 
our Marines, would be turned over to the complete command of Haitian 
officers on October 1,1934, and our Marine and naval forces would be 
withdrawn during the month of October. However, when President 
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Roosevelt visited Cap-haïtien July 5 last, President Vincent [of Haiti] 
requested that, if at all possible, the date for carrying out these movements 
should be advanced; and President Roosevelt stated that we would 
advance the date for turnover the command of the Garde to August 1, 
instead of October, and would withdraw our forces from Haiti in the 
following fortnight... 174 
Companies C and D, 2nd Marines were transferred to the United States in July 
1934. Headquarters, 2nd Marines and Company B were deactivated.175 
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Appendix 1: First Provisional Brigade of Marines 
There have been a number of "1st Provisional Brigade of Marines" in the history 
of the US Marine Corps, dating back to at least 1899, usually organized for expeditionary 
purposes. The early history of "1st Marine Regiment" follows a similar pattern. 
The first permanent Marine regiments were organized in 1913 as part of the 
Advance Base Force. 1st and 2nd Marines were originally designated 1st and 2nd 
Regiments, Advance Base Force Brigade. However, except for one exercise, on the 
island of Culebra with the Atlantic Fleet in early 1914, both regiments would see more 
service as expeditionary regiments. 
After returning to the United States in late 1914, after duty in Vera Cruz, Mexico, 
First and Second Regiments were reequipped as fixed and mobile (base) defense 
regiments, respectively. According to the 1915 report of the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, 1 st Regiment was to reorganize and reequip with four 5-inch gun companies, a 
searchlight company, an engineer company, a mine company, and an air defense 
company. Second Regiment was split between the Advanced Base Force base at the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pensacola Naval Air Station, the New Orleans naval station, and 
the USS Washington (probably the 12th Company). The Artillery Battalion (one wonders 
why they decided to maintain an artillery battalion of three 3-inch gun batteries when 1st 
Regiment was to have four 5-inch (fixed) gun batteries) was stationed at the Naval 
Academy. Nevertheless, the entire brigade would deploy, in stages over July and August 
1915, as infantry regiments and an artillery battalion. "The force in Haiti includes the 
technical companies which have been engaged in advance base training in Philadelphia. 
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Owing to this interruption in the training of the fixed defense force, its efficiency as an 
advance base organization will be materially interfered with." 
First Provisional Brigade of Marines were apparently the first significant deployed 
Marine force to use motor transport for troops and artillery. A Marine aviation squadron 
deployed to Haiti in 1919 and was attached to 1st Brigade. The 1919 Commandant's 
report states the squadron, and a detachment in Santo Domingo were performing a wide 
variety of missions: "Offensive operations with machine guns and bombs; 
reconnoitering, photographing, and photographic map-making; contact patrols and 
cooperating with ground troops; quick transmission of messages, papers, and officers; 
regular mail service between different units." The Marine squadron, under various 
designations, would remain attached to 1st Brigade until it was withdrawn in 1934.176 
August 1915: 
1st Provisional Brigade 
3rd Company (Signal) 
















22nd Company 24th Company 
USS Connecticut Battalion 
1st Conn. Company 
2nd Conn. Company 
3rd Conn. Company 
4th Conn. Company 
Marine Detachment, USS 
Washington 






Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (August 1915): 88 officers, 1,941 Marines. 
September 1916: 
1 st Provisional Brigade of Marines 
2nd Regiment 
Naval Detachment 
1 & 2 Sees, 7th Company 







(11th & 15th Companies detached; 10th Company to return to 2nd Regiment in 
November.) 
Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 1916): 61 officers, 1,020 Marines. 
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June 1917: 









Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31,1918): 64 officers, 884 Marines 
(including Gendarmerie detachment). 
June 1919: 













1st Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (attached) 
Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (July 1, 1919): 98 officers, 1,526 Marines 
(including Gendarmerie detachment). 
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December 1919: 















Squadron E, Marine Aviation (attached) (Redesignated 4th Air Squadron, 1 January 
1921) 
Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31,1919): 83 officers, 1,261 
Marines (including Gendarmerie detachment). 
July 1924: 
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines 
2nd Regiment 8th Regiment 
53rd Company 36th Company 
54th Company 57th Company 
64th Company 63rd Company 
153rd Company 100th Company 
197th Company 148th Company 
196th Company 
Observation Squadron No. 2 (VO-2M) (attached) (redesignated 1 March 1923) 
July 1925: 
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines 
2nd Regiment 2nd Battalion. 2nd Regiment 
36th Company 54th Company 











VO-9M (attached) (redesignated 1 July 1927) 
Commanders 
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines 
Col Littleton W. T. Waller 
BrigGen Eli K. Cole 
Col John H. Russell 
BrigGen Albertus W. Catlin 
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 
Col John H. Russell 
Col George Van Orden 
Col Theodore P. Kane 
Col William N.McKelvy 
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller 
Col William N. McKelvy 
Col Harold C. Snyder 
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller 
Col John T. Myers 
Col Presley M. Rixey, Jr. 
Col Louis M. Gulick 
Col Richard M. Cutts 
BrigGen Louis McCarty Little 
1st Regiment 
Col Theodore P. Kane 
Col Eli K. Cole 
15 Aug 1915-21 Nov 1916 
22 Nov 1916-27 Nov 1917 
28 Nov 1917-6 Dec 1918 
7 Dec 1918-14 Jul 1919 
15 Jul 1919-1 Oct 1919 
2 Oct 1919- 14 Jan 1922 
15 Jan 1922-28 Mar 1922 
29 Mar 1922 - 15 Nov 1923 
16 Nov 1923-21 Jan 1924 
21 Jan 1924- 11 Jun 1925 
12 Jun 1925 - 25 Jun 1925 
26 Jun 1925-29 Jul 1925 
30 Jul 1925 - 7 Dec 1925 
8 Dec 1925 - 24 Jan 1928 
25 Jan 1928 - 22 Feb 1928 
23 Feb 1928 - 24 Jun 1929 
25 Jun 1929-11 May 1931 
3 Jun 1931-15 Aug 1934 
8 Aug 1915-15 Aug 1915 
16 Aug -8 May 1916 
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2nd Regiment (later, 2nd Marines) 
Col Eli K. Cole 
Col Theodore P. Kane 
Col Eli K. Cole 
LtCol Philip M. Bannon 
Maj Richard S. Hooker 
Maj John W. Wadleigh 
LtCol Richard S. Hooker 
LtCol Thomas H. Brown 
Col Randolph C. Barkeley 
Col George Van Orden 
Col William N.McKelvy 
Maj Maurice E. Shearer 
Col Harold C. Snyder 
Col Macker Babb 
Maj Archibald Young 
Col Presley M. Rixey 
Col Richard P. Williams 
Col Edward B. Manwaring 
Col Harry G. Bartlett 
Col James T. Buttrick 
Col Eli T. Fryer 
Maj Samuel P. Budd 
8th Regiment 
LtCol Thomas M. Clinton 
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 
LtCol Thomas M. Clinton 
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 
Col Dickinson P. Hall 
Col James T. Bootes 
LtCol Harry R. Lay 
Col James T. Bootes 
Col Harold C. Snyder 
Artillery Battalion 
Maj Robert H. Dunlap 
31 Jul 1915 -15 Aug 1915 
16 Aug 1915 - 30 Jun 1916 
1 Jul 1916-30 Nov 1916 
I Dec 1916-10 Jan 1918 
II Jan 1918-31 Mar 1918 
I Apr 1918-28 Apr 1918 
29 Apr 1918-20 Jul 1919 
21 Jul 1919-2 Oct 1919 
3 Oct 1919-20 Oct 1921 
21 Oct 1921-9 Jul 1923 
10 Jul 1923 - 10 Jun 1925 
II Jun 1925-30 Jun 1925 
1 Jul 1925 - 8 Apr 1926 
9 Apr 1926 - 30 Jun 1927 
1 Jul 1927- 19 Aug 1927 
20 Aug 1927 - 21 May 1929 
22 May 1929-30 May 1930 
31 May 1930- 15 May 1932 
16 May 1932-16 Jun 1932 
17 Jun 1932-27 Dec 1933 
28 Dec 1933 -31 May 1934 
1 Jun 1934 -15 Aug 1934 
17 Dec 1919-4 Jan 1920 
5 Jan 1920 - 28 Jul 1920 
28 Jul 1920 -19 Sep 1920 
20 Sep 1920 - 30 Apr 1921 
1 May 1921-9 Apr 1923 
9 Apr 1923 - 29 Apr 1923 
30 Apr 1923 -30 May 1923 
31 May 1923-20 Jul 1924 
24 Jul 1924-31 Jun 1925 
15 Aug 1915-17 May 1916 
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1st Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (later, in order of redesignations, 4th 
Air Squadron, VO-2M, and VO-9M) 
Capt. Harvey B. Sims 
Capt Roy S. Geiger 
Capt Arthur H. Page, Jr. 
Maj Francis T. Evans 
Capt. Louis M. Bourne 
Maj Roy S. Geiger 
Capt. Russell A. Presley 
Maj Francis T. Evans 
Maj James E. Davis 
Maj James T. Moore 
22 Feb 1919-30 Nov 1919 
1 Dec 1919-20 Jan 1921 
21 Jan 1921 -28 Mar 1921 
29 Mar 1921 - 4 Mar 1923 
5 Mar 1923 - 12 Nov 1925 
13 Nov 1925-8 Jul 1927 
9 Jul 1927 - 28 Aug 1928 
29 Aug 1928 - 2 Jul 1930 
3 Jul 1930 - 15 May 1932 
16 May 1932- 15 Aug 1934177 
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Appendix 2: Ships of the 1915 Haitian Campaign 
Ship Name Pennant 
United States Ships178 
USS Connecticut• BB-18 
USS Washington** CA-11 
USS Tennessee CA-10 
USS Castine PG-6 
USS Nashville PG-7 
USS Marietta PG-15 
USS Sacrament PG-19 
USS Eagle none 
USSJoro« AC-12 
USS Osceola AT-48 
USS Solace AH-2 
Haitian Ships179 







Armored Cruiser renamed USS Seattle, 
November 1916 
Armored Cruiser renamed USS 






Collier (Coal carrier) 
Tug 
Hospital Ship 
Gunboat fate unknown 
Gunboat Blown ashore, August 
1915 
•Not believed assigned to Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet, 1915. 
••Flagship, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet 
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Appendix 3: The Gendarmerie (Garde) d'Haïti, 1916-1934 
For the United States, the easiest part of the Haitian-American Treaty to 
implement would be the requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish 
law and order in Haiti. This would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haïti. 
From the documentary evidence, the actual Gendarmerie Agreement appeared to 
evolve from some period of negotiation between the United States and Haiti. An original 
English-language draft, for example, set forth a requirement for 1,296 Gendarmes180, 
while the final document required 2100. Additionally, the American officers in the 
original document would report to the Haitian Secretary of State for the Interior, in the 
final document they report to the President of Haiti. 
While the Gendarmerie agreement was not officially signed until August 1916, 
the documentary evidence shows that the United States was actively recruiting and 
organizing a Gendarmerie in December 1915 and January 1916, using Article X of the 
American-Haitian Treaty as their authority. (The Gendarmerie Agreement would be 
renegotiated at least twice before the end of the Occupation.) By 1 February, 1916, the 
first Chef of the Gendarmerie, Smedley Butler, and Colonel Waller felt they were in a 
position to take over the law enforcement mission. 
The organization of the Gendarmerie was completed by October 1916, and a total 
of 117 Gendarmerie posts were established throughout the country. Four Gendarmerie 
districts were established in the country, consisting of Port-au-Prince, the Cape, the 
Artibonite, and the South. Eighteen Gendarmerie companies were raised and were 
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roughly divided amongst the four districts. What amounted to a battalion (1st, 4th, and 
17th companies) garrisoned Port-au-Prince.181 
A small coast guard of six officers, eight petty officers, and 30 seamen was 
authorized by the original agreement. By 1919, a force of three former-US Navy 
submarine chasers (relatively small, wooden patrol boats with a nominal anti-submarine 
capability [probably removed for the Haitians]) was in operation.182 
Haitians were recruited as volunteers, clothed in uniforms supplied by the Marine 
Corps, and provided with surplus American weapons (Krag rifles by most reports). 
While Butler would brag to the Senate investigating committee in 1921 that he was able 
to recruit the best men in Haiti for the Gendarmerie, he was also forced to admit that 
initially he had problems with disease in the ranks ("95 per cent of them had blood 
diseases and 85 per cent had intestinal worms") that had to be eradicated before the troops 
could be effective.183 
The Caco revolt of 1918-20 was the Gendarmerie's first major crisis, and one 
might argue its finest hour. The initial Caco attacks initially fell on Gendarmerie posts, 
and there are many reports of outnumbered gendarmes loyally defending their posts, often 
successfully, and in some cases bravely protecting their wounded Marine officers.184 
Limited offensive operations, particularly in the Artibonite, were conducted by small 
Gendarmerie units and their Marine offices.185 Eventually, however, the Marine Brigade 
had to be called in to assist in a problem that had grown out of control. 
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Major A. S. Williams, Butler's successor, was the man who had outlawed the 
corvée (it was certain officers ignoring this order that led, in part, to the investigations of 
1920-22 and, in some Marines' opinions, one of the primary causes of the Caco revolt.)186 
Colonel Frederick M. ("Dopey") Wise, Williams' successor, found that the Gendarmerie 
at the height of the Caco revolt had been pretty much worn down and out: 
I found the Gendarmes in Port-au-prince well drilled, well 
uniformed, well armed. They had been the show troops of my 
predecessors. But outside of Port-au-prince they were in bad shape. Their 
uniforms were in rags. Most of them were barefooted. Their rifles were a 
joke. They were discarded Krags, most of them with the sights knocked 
off. If they hit a house at point-blank range with those weapons they were 
doing well. Their barracks were tumble-down. Their morale was pretty 
low.. ,187 
Colonel Wise got money from the financial advisor for uniforms, barracks, an 
increased rations allowance, and new Springfield '03 rifles from the Marines. He spread 
the Marine standard of drill throughout the Gendarmerie and emphasized marksmanship. 
His troops responded well, and became a significant fighting force.188 The special 
operation that killed per a 11©, the principal Caco leader, was led by Marine 
Sergeants Herman H. Hanneken and William R. Button serving as Gendarmerie officers, 
but also included 20 gendarmes; all their intelligence came from gendarme sources as 
well, including at least one man operating under cover with the Cacos. 
The Gendarmerie Agreement of 1916 had been renegotiated in 1920 to allow for 
easier financial administration by the Chef of the Gendarmerie, although Colonel Wise 
did not receive everything he had wanted, and the ability of the Gendarmerie to surge by 
467 men in times of emergency, finances permitting. Established strength would still be 
81 American officers, 383 Haitian non-commissioned officers, and 2100 gendarmes, but 
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would also now include 39 Haitian officers.189 Soon after General Russell arrived in 
Port-au-prince as High commissioner, an Ecole Militaire for the commissioning of 
Haitian officers (capacity 12) was established in Port-au-Prince, with a Haitian officer as 
deputy to its American commander.190 
One complaint about the Marine officers up to the time of the Caco revolt 
. . . was that the ex-enlisted Garde officers were ill-educated, raw rankers, 
an accusation that during World War I, when the best Marines of all ranks 
were going to France, was probably true. But Russell's earliest effort was 
to upgrade this class of officer not only by diligent selection but by a 
three-month indoctrination course before the officers were passed for duty 
with the Garde. In 1930,49 Garde officers were college graduates; 51 had 
high school diplomas or some college courses. That same year 85 spoke 
French and 92 also spoke Créole. The entire group, 116 Americans in all, 
averaged over four years in Haiti and thirteen years in the Corps.191 
Although the Gendarmerie (Garde after 1928) was the local police force as well as 
the Haitian military, it had never received significant riot control training, which is one of 
the reasons the Marines had to be called in to handle the Les Cayes incident that 
eventually resulted in 12 deaths. Nevertheless, General Russell could say in his final 
report: 
. . . the Garde d'Haïti is less than a fourth of the numerical strength of the 
old forces. An officers' school has been created and a military career is 
one which a self-respecting Haitian can adopt The men are modernly 
housed, equipped, uniformed, educated if illiterate, and paid $10.00 a 
month, a suitable pay for Haitian conditions. Prisons are immaculately 
clean and airy; buildings have workshop facilities. Graft has been 
eliminated. A modem accounting and purchasing system has been 
introduced which has effected important economies. Due to supervision 
by district commanders Haitian communal revenues, previously dissipated 
in graft and unwise expenditures, have greatly increased and communal 
administration strengthened. A reorganized medical department has more 
than halved the death and disease rate among personnel and prisoners. In 
the first four years of the Occupation, the Garde also carried over an 
important road-building program.192 
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In 1930, General Russell reported a force of2,622 enlisted gendarmes, in a total 
strength of 3,460 (one gendarme for every 3.4 square miles and 690 inhabitants of Haiti); 
36% of its officers were Haitian, and the Ecole Militaire had graduated 17 aspirants the 
previous year. In addition to its police and military duties, Russell reported the following: 
• Communications; 309.5 miles of telephone lines, 9 airfields built through Garde 
labor. 
• Police services, fire and traffic control. 
• communal administration; Garde commanders were communal advisors and had to 
supervise the collection and distribution of communal revenues. 
• Marksmanship; a hitherto unknown Haitian military skill. 
• Construction, a four year program that resulted in 24 modified and eight new 
outpost buildings. 
• Coast Guard, which also has the responsibility for 15 lighthouses and a buoy 
system.193 
A lot of the Haitianization negotiations went into the Haitianization of the Garde. 
On August 1,1934, the completely Haitianized Garde, with its new Haitian Commander, 
Colonel Démosthènes P. Calixte—the same Haitian who was the first Haitian deputy 
commander of the Ecole Militaire, saluted the Marine Brigade as it left Port-au-Prince, 
and hoisted the Haitian flag over the former Marine headquarters. 
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Gendarmerie (Garde) dliaïti Commanders, 1915-1934 (appointment as Haitian general of 
division): 
LtCol. Smedley D. Butler 
Col. Alexander S. Williams 
LtCol, Frederick M. Wise 
LtCol. Richard S. Hooker 
LtCol. Douglas C. McDougal 
Col. Julius S. Turrill 
Col. Frank E. Evans 
Col. Richard P. Williams 
LtCol. Clayton B. Vogel 
3 Dec 1915-1 May 1918 
2 May 1918-18 Jul 1919 
19 Jul 1919-16 Jan 1921 
17 Jan 1921-14 Apr 1921 
15 Apr 1921-11 Apr 1925 
12 Apr 1925- 12 May 1927 
18 May 1927-31 Mar 1930 
1 Apr 1930-21 Jun 1933 
22 Jun 1933 -31 Jul 1934194 
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Annex B: The Fiscal Case for Occupation 
One of the basic justifications for the American intervention and occupation of 
Haiti was that Haiti was incapable of handling its own finances. The Senate committee 
investigating the United States Occupations of Haiti and Santo Domingo heard evidence 
on the finances of both countries. 
John A. Mcllhenny, financial advisor to the government of Haiti (1919-1922), 
presented the US Government's case on the financial state of Haiti at the time of the 
Occupation. 
Fiscal Year 1912-13 (Haitian fiscal years ran 1 October to 30 September): 
Total Revenues: $5,073,691.40 
Debt Service: 2,507,533.07 
Balance for all other expenses 2,506,138.33 
Expended on all other expenses 3,787,426.48 
Deficit 1,281,288.15 
Loan (in partial coverage of the deficit) 607,902.76 
The $600,000 loan was nominally at 6 2/3 per cent interest; but as Mcllhenny explained, 
discounting and exchange rate manipulations (favorite areas for graft in and around the 
Haitian Government) resulted in a drastically different picture. 
The loan was issued at 94, meaning that for every 100 dollars of the loan the 
Haitian government was liable for, it only would receive 94 dollars to spend. In theory. 
This particular loan would only accept payment at an exchange rate of 3.50 gourdes to the 
dollar, while the commercial rate for the gourde at the time of the loan was 4.70 to the 
dollar. So, translated into gourds, instead of 100 dollars discounted to 94 dollars (a 
discount rate of "94"); the loan really was at a rate of470 gourdes, discounted to 329. 
The real discount rate was therefore 61. [My math comes out to 70.] Thus, the Haitian 
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Government was paying 6 2/3 per cent interest on a loan principle (in gourdes) of 
2,857,142.97 gourdes, but only received an even 2 million gourdes to try to balance their 
budget. 
The $600,000 balance or so of the 1912-13 deficit was taken care of by a 
"statutory advance" from the Banque Nationale, which was required, by its concession, to 
hold at the disposal of the Haitian Government. 
Fiscal year 1913-14: 
Total revenues: $5,018,801.32 
Debt service: 4,231,091.31 
Balance: 787,710.01 
Other Expenditures: 3,803,244.85 
Deficit: 3,015,534.84 
Three loans totaling a little over $1 million partially covered the deficit, the remainder of 
the deficit was covered by the Banque Nationale. These internal loans were at the same 6 
2/3 percentage rate as the loan for 1912-13, with the same legerdemain as that loan: 
Amount Nominal Loan Gourde Commercial Actual 
of Loan Discount Rate Gourde Rate Discount 
500,000 80 3.50 4.75 59 
300,000 80 3.50 5.00 56 
240,000 80 3.50 6.00 47 
The balance of the deficit was covered by still more loans from the Banque 
Nationale and by "unauthorized private loans, which now constitute claims of more or 
less doubtful validity." These loans to private individuals were covered by the 
government by issuing "bons du trésor", denominated in either gold or gourdes depending 
on the issue. These bons du trésor were also issued to cover government salaries. 
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The low debt service for 1914-15 was because "a revolutionary government", 
presumably that of Guillaume Sam, "took revenue service away from the bank . . . 
revenue pledges disregarded . . . and only $754,892.82 was devoted to debt service." So 
in 1914-15, the new Guillaume Sam government ignored at least three quarters of his new 
government's obligation to make debt service payments and was still unable to balance 
the budget. According to McDhenny's testimony, the government issued "paper flat 
money" worth 3 million gourdes (which at a nominal rate of 5 gourdes to the dollar would 
barely cover the year's deficit) and had the effect of pushing the gourde rate down to 9.90 
to the dollar. 
Mr. Mcllhenny's opening statement concluded "the borrowing capacity of Haiti at 
home and abroad was exhausted. Its paper money was practically worthless. For four 
years it had been the scene of uninterrupted revolution." 
During these years [1911-1915] a large part of [the Haitian 
Government's] running expenses had been left unpaid. Revenue pledges, 
if observed, left an amount for other expenses than debt services which 
was only about 20 per cent of the amount required for that purpose, and 
the deficit could no longer be covered by loans, whether internal or 
external, or by issues of flat money. The closing of foreign markets by 
war restrictions affecting Haiti's export products, and practical cessation of 
foreign commerce because of lack of maritime transportation, resulted in 
an enormous decrease in customs revenues, which then constituted fully 
95 per cent of the total revenue of the country. Financially and politically 
Haiti was in a condition of complete collapse. 
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At the time of the Intervention, Haiti was in arrears on three French loans (1875, 
1896,1910), for a total of over 12 million French francs on loans totaling over 120 
million francs. There were also another loan covering "the interest coupon maturing May 
15, 1915, on the external loan of 1910." In May 1916, Admiral Caperton's revenue 
collectors made payments to the French Banque de l'Union Parisienne of just under 
$300,000, extinguishing the loan, and leaving Haiti of a small credit of just under 
400,000 francs. 
Mcllhenny was asked about the public debt of Haiti for the years 1919 and 1922, 
and he presented the balance sheets found in Appendix 1. It was noted by the Senate 
panel that Haiti's public debt had been reduced about $4.5 million between 1919 and 
1922. Ulis Mcllhenny noted would be about $5 million if the value of his sinking funds 
were included. He did not call attention to the fact that the external funded debt of Haiti 
was reduced from almost $26 million to $8.3 million in part because the exchange rate for 
the French franc fell from 18 cents to 9V* cents. Mcllhenny then offered a short statement 
on "outstanding fiduciary" Haitian currency for the two years, remarking that it, as a debt, 
was in addition to what was shown on the two balance sheets presented in Appendix 1. 
Fiduciary currency outstanding February 28,1919: 
Paper money equivalent to $1,775,594.40 
Nickel coin equivalent to 1,400,000.00 
Copper coin equivalent to 49,000.00 
$3,224,594.40 
Less reserve for retirement of paper money (Dec. 31,1918) 1.735.664.69 
Net debt on account of fiduciary currency 1,488,929.71 
Fiduciary currency outstanding February 28, 1922: 
Nickel coin equivalent to $1,400,000.00 
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Copper coin equivalent to 49.000.00 
$1,449,000.00 
Less reserve for retirement of nickel coin (Jan. 31, 1922) 
Nickel coin equivalent to 184,448.37 
United States currency 49,467.80 
233,916.67 
Present net debt on account of fiduciary currency... 1,215,083.83 
Reduction in net debt on account of fiduciary currency 273,845.88 
At the request of the committee, Mcllhenny then presented comparative 
statements of Haitian receipts and expenses. 






1911-12.... $6,324,652.21 (2) $6,324,652.21 (3) 
1912-13.... 5,073,691.40 5,073,691.40 
1913-14.... 5,018,801.32 5,018,801.32 
1914-15.... 3,311,548.14 ............... 3,311,548.14 
1915-16.... 4,559,002.14 $109,878.38 4,668,880.52 .............. 
1916-17.... 3,795,364.88 136,375.46 3,931,740.34 $3,350,471.58 
1917-18.... 3,178,022.53 154,245.14 3,332,267.67 2,922,999.49 
1918-19.... 5,747,117.43 216,762.87 5,963,880.30 2,818,486.84 
1919-20.... 6,421,000.41 374,820.28 6,795,820.69 4,080,373.25 
1920-21.... 3,606,173.00 360,102.42 3,966,275.42 3,819,625.70 
1. Other than debt service, and including certain expenses properly pertaining to past 
years as detailed in table below. 
2. No separate record of internal revenue prior to American intervention; amount was 
negligible and is probably in customs receipts. 
3. There are no data to determine expenditures to the first year shown. 
Debt Service. Other Expenses. 
Year. Total. 
External. Internal. Past. Current. 
1912-13 $1,391,997.44 $1,175,555.63 $3,787,426.48$6,354,979.55 
1913-14 3,199,310.72 1,031,780.59 3,803,244.85 8,034,336.16 
1914-15 511,002.35 243,890.51 3,082,700.53 3,837,593.39 
1915-16 '321,531.38 215,237.17 2,227,358.36 2,764,126.91 
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1916-17 3,350,471.58 3,350,471.58 
1917-18. 2,922,999.49 2,922,999.49 
1918-19 2281,409.25 3$70,056.00 2,748,430.54 3,099,896.09 
1919-20 43,000,000.00 549,000.00 4,080,373.25 7,129,373.25 
1920-21 ^,896,789.00 7187,989.00 834,560.00 3,785,065.70 3,819,625.70 
1. Including transfers by Admiral Caperton to France in the amount of $296,715.06. 
2. Composed of $ 181,981.25 interest on indebtedness to Banque Nationale from Jan. 1, 
1917 to Sept. 30,1918, and $99,428 interest and amortization on short-term Compagnie 
Haïtienne de Construction notes for the current year and from Oct. 1,1919 to Feb. 29, 
1920, of the following fiscal year. 
3. Composed of $41,120 arrears of P. C. S. Railroad interest guaranty for balance of year 
1916-17 and part of year 1917-18, and $28,936.30 arrears of wharfage pledged to Wharf 
Co. of Port-au-Prince for the fiscal years from 1915-16 to 1917-18. 
4. For arrears of interest to Dec. 31,1919. 
5. For interest on the short-term Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction notes for the 
balance of the current year from Mar. 1 to Sept. 20,1920. 
6. Composed of $2,200,000 for arrears of interest and amortization to Sept. 30,1920, and 
$695,789.47 for service of current fiscal year. 
7. Composed of $84,000 interest and amortization on the short-term Compagnie 
Haïtienne de Construction notes for the current year, and $103,989.29 interest on the note 
to the Banque Nationale for the fiscal year 1918-19. 
8. Arrears of P. C. S. Railroad interest guaranty for balance of fiscal year 1917-18. 
Amounts shown under "Current" above are amounts actually paid for those years. 
Some items of current expense not paid during year accrued, thus total of "Past" and 
"Current" columns show a more accurate basis of comparison of amounts available for 
debt service after other expenses: 
1913-1 4 $1,231,374.84 
1914-1 5 228,847.61 
1915-1 6 2,441,522.61 
1916-1 7 581,268.76 
1917-1 8 $409,268.18 
1918-1 9 3,145,393.46 
1919-2 0 2,715,447.44 
1920-2 1 146,649.72 
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Last 10 years. 
Last 5 years.., 
Last 3 years.. 
$4,838,745.80 
4,797,996.88 $3,398,391.37 $ 1,399,605.21 
5,575,325.47 3,572,828.60 2,002,496.87 
Under the [1922] loan project, the following amounts would be required [annually]: 
1. Increasing at the annual rate of $5,000. 
According to Mcllhenny's testimony, the Haitian budget for ordinary expenses had 
been $3,481,064.43, excluding debt service, since fiscal year 1919-20. Over the two year 
period since that first fiscal year, it had been necessary to seek extraordinary or 
supplemental credits for emergencies such as, in the previous year, fighting a small pox 
epidemic, $48,000; fires, $2,000; League of Nations [dues?], $10,000; fire protection 
system for Port-au-Prince, $10,000; purchase of real property, $10,000; supply purchase 
fund, $15,000; water system for Port-au-Prince, over $20,000; geodetic survey, $25,000. 
Nevertheless, Mcllhenny thought that the current year budget could be kept within the 
allotted $3,481,064.43. Added to that the projected $1,460,000 for debt service under the 
loan project, then the revenue requirement to meet Haiti's annual expenses would be $4, 
941,064.43. 
$16 million external debt. 





To this, would have to be added the annual interest and sinking fund guaranty on 
the national railroad bonds, a further $248,120.71. This would bring the total revenue 
requirements to $5,189,185.14. 
"This amount is well within the average receipts of the last three years, but is 
more than the average receipts for the past five years." Mcllhenny pointed out the five 
year average was thrown off by World War I, and given the current increases over 
previous years in customs receipts, he would anticipate that total annual revenues would 
amount to some $6 million. 
In response to a question about customs duties, Mcllhenny said that coffee 
exports, which was about 95% of Haitian exports at the time, had a export duty of 32%, 
or three cents gold per pound. At current prices, the export duty did not affect exports to 
France, but combined with the United States import duties, it was priced out of the coffee 
markets by Brazilian and Santos coffees. Mcllhenny said his goal was to reduce the 
export duty on the coffee, which adversely effected the Haitian peasant, by increasing the 
internal revenue of Haiti. 
Apparently there was no internal revenue collection in Haiti prior to the U. S. 
Occupation, although some laws were on the books. While the Occupation was not 
responsible for the collection of internal taxes, the Haitians had made some effort for 
their collection under U. S. urging. It turned out that Mcllhenny had had to go to the 
Banque Nationale for the records of tax collections because the Haitian treasury didn't 
keep such records. Discovering that internal revenue taxes were due on the rental of 
government property, Mcllhenny approached the responsible Ministry of the Interior 
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official for the records, the man told Mcllhenny that he had stopped keeping the 
records about four years prior because they were too much trouble to keep! So, in many 
cases, Mcllhenny had no way of finding out just what the Haitian government was 
legitimately owed, and so, even if he had wanted to lower tariffs to help Haitian exports, 
he couldn't do so until he could figure out what the Haitian government was owed for the 
laws already on the books. In another case, the Banque Nationale had records of $41,000 
for collections for laws that Mcllhenny could not find on the books (other testimony held 
that they were an income tax and transfer stamps based on a law passed in 1907 and 
modified in 1913.)'95 
When Mcllhenny's testimony resumed on 15 March, 1922, questioning began with 
expenditures for the maintenance of the government, based on an estimated $6 million 
government revenue. The following figures are from a memorandum read to the 
committee by Mcllhenny. 
Present actual annual cost of debt service (including amortization only in the cases of the 
external loans and in the Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction short term notes): 
External funded debt, 6,952,097.21 francs @ 9V2 cents $660,449.23 
Internal loans of 1912 and 1913 44,885.63 
Internal loans of 1914 104,353.82 
Banque Nationale short-term note.. 103,989.29 
Irrigation and market Cayes 4,392.22 
Sambour commission1 66,677.05 
BonsFouchard. 939.59 
Compaigne Haïtienne de Construction. * 84.000.00 
1,069,686.83 
1. The Sambour Commission adjudicated a floating debt, and bonded it at 6 per cent. 
Although the bonds were never issued, the 6 per cent interest was due annually on the 
amount 
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The above figures did not include the debts for the Haitian railroad company. Part 
of this was because of the different funding schemes over the years yielded internal as 
well as external debts, financed at variable rates of interest between 6 and 6 2/3 percent. 
Total internal and floating debt came to over $10 million as of 28 February 1922. Based 
on that figure, Mcllhenny figured the debt service as: 
Service of internal debt; interest, 6 per cent; and amortization, 1 
percent . $753,860.23 
Service of external debt, 6,952,097.21 francs at par, 19.3 
cents 1,341,854.56 
(It must be remembered that Mcllhenny was still promoting his debt consolidation plan, 
which would most commonly be known as the 1922-23 loan plan) According to 
Mcllhenny, his debt consolidation plan compared favorably with this at: 
$16,000,000 external series. .$1,110,000 
$5,000,000 internal series, interest 6 per cent and amortization 1 per cent... 350.000 
Total cost of debt service under refunding plan... 1,460,000 
However, Mcllhenny's figures got worse when he figured the current external debt 
(denominated in French francs) at the current exchange rate for the franc (9Yit) as 
opposed to the "at par" rate (19.3$: 
Service of internal debt, as above . ... $753,860.23 
Service of external debt, at the current exchange rate 660,449.23 
Total approximate cost of present debt service at current rate of 
exchange 1,414,309.46 
While the current exchange rate brought total debt service about $46,000 under 
the refunding plan, Mcllhenny advised not depending on the continued devaluation of the 
franc and going ahead with the refunding plan. He was still arguing for anything that 
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would reduce the import/export tax burden, which Mcllhenny said was borne entirely by 
the peasant class. 
The Senators' questioning then turned to the national railroad, which Mcllhenny 
said was $1,700,071.29 in interest arrears, plus $230,407.77 in arrears for the sinking 
fund, for a total of $1,930,479.06. Apparently, the Haitian government, before the 
Occupation, got itself into a contract with the railroad company where it was required to 
pay "kilometric guaranties", in effect, it had to guarantee the interest on bonds that the 
railroad company issue upon the completion of every 20 kilometers of line ($20,000 per 
kilometer). In other words, since a total of 177 kilometers (!) of railroad had been 
completed, the Haitian Government was responsible for the interest on $3,544,581.60 par 
value of outstanding railroad bonds. Normal annual charge were for $212,674.90 for 
interest and $5,445.81 for amortization, meaning that the Haitian government was almost 
nine years in arrears. The debt still stood, however, despite the fact that the railroad had 
never produced any income for the Haitian government, and it had been recently decided 
by its engineers that the current planned route had been in error. 
Finally, on the 19th, Mcllhenny responded to questions about the internal revenue 
fees. Mcllhenny had originally taken the estimate of the Ministers of the Interior and 
Finance that revenues from the rentals of government land would be $9,000; the actual 
amount turned out to be $23,473, even through there were no assessment rolls or other 
accounting devices to actually check where the money came from. 
Consular fees were another area where the estimates fell well short of the actual 
"product". For 1919-20, the estimate was $2,000 and the product was really $9,686.71. 
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This is despite the fact that the amount actually collected, in Cuba at least, was much 
higher. It turns out that the Haitian consuls collected $2 from each Haitian laborer that 
went to Cuba to work. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1919-20,29,181 Haitians went to Cuba to 
work. Of their $2, one dollar went to the consul the other dollar was supposed to be 
sent to Haiti for the Government. However, only $1,984 in consular fees came in from 
Cuba in 1919-20, less than 7% of what was supposed to have been collected.196 
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Appendix 1: Public Debt of Haiti, 1919 vs. 1922. 
Public debt of the Republic of Haiti. Condition as of February 28, 1919. 
Funded debt: 
External loans (in francs) 
1875, at 5 per cent interest-
Capital 19,252,560.00 
Interest Arrears 3.529,636.00 
22,782,196.00 
1896, 6 per cent-
Capital 37,638,500.00 
Interest Arrears 8.280.470.00 
45,913,970.00 
1910, 5 per cent-
Capital 64,021,000.00 
Interest Arrears 11.641.858.84 
75.662.858.54 
Internal loans-
Fouchard, 6 per cent-
Capital $15,659.85 
Interest Arrears 2.818.77 
1912, 6 per cent-
Capital 246,347.00 
Interest Arrears 44.342.46 
1913, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 451,572.10 
Interest Arrears 94.065.03 
1914-A, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 705,078.00 
Interest Arrears 160.601.10 
1914-B, 6 2/3 percent-
Capital 528,264.00 















Banque Nationale advances 1,733,154.87 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent.... 225.310.13 
1,958,465.00 
Cie Haïtienne de Construction. 360,000.00 
P. C. S. railroad interest guarantied 
arrears 75,680.00 
National Railroad Bonds-
Interest guarantied arrears 1,062,046.59 
Sinking fund guarantied arrears. 124.060.34 
1,186,106.93 
Cie Haïtienne du Wharf, subsidy arrears 28,936.29 
Banque Nationale, treasury commissions 107,260.45 
French cable company, subsidy arrears 84,422.04 
Irrigation system, Cayes 43,109.40 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent 7.759.69 
50,869.09 
Market, Cayes 39,094.26 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent 5.668.68 
44,762.94 
Sambour commission debt 1,111,284.11 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent. 344.498.07 
1,455,782.18 
Féquière commission debt 733,630.98 
Cathedral 83,690.00 
Archbishopric 46,380.68 
Jetty, Jacmel 111.040.33 
Total Interest funded and floating debt 9,141,797.32 
Claims (estimated amount of allowances) 750,000.00 
External funded debt converted at 18 cents per franc 25.985.524.42 
Total public debt 35,877,321.74 
Less sinking funds reserves, fiscal year 1915-16..... 21,920.98 
Net public debt 35.855.4flO.761*7 
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Public debt of the Republic of Haiti-Condition as of February 28,1922. 
Funded debt: 
External loans (francs)— 
1896, 6 per cent 26,338,500.00 




Cie Haïtienne de Const. 6 per cent $194,400.00 
Banque Nationale 6 per cent 1.733.154.87 
Total 1,927,554.87 
Bonds— 
Fouchard, 6 per cent-
Capital $15,659.85 
Interest arrears 5.480.95 
1912, 6 per cent-
Capital 246,347.00 
Interest arrears 86.221.45 
1913, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 451,572.10 
Interest arrears 177.580.74 
1914-A, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 705,078.00 
Interest arrears 293.782.50 
1914-B, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 528,264.00 
Interest arrears 227.467.00 
1914-C, 6 2/3 per cent-
Capital 331,965.25 











Interest guaranteed arrears 1,700,071.29 
Sinking fund guaranteed arrears.. 230.407.77 
Banque Nationale, treasury commissions — 107,260.45 
French Cable Co., subsidy arrears 84,422.04 
Irrigation system, Cayes 43,109.40 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent 15.519.31 
Market, Cayes 39,094.26 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent 12.705.63 
58,628.71 
51,799.89 
Sambour commission debt 1,111,284.11 
Interest accrued, 6 per cent 544.529.21 
1,655,813.32 
Fequière commission debt..., 773,630.98 
Cathedral 83,690.00 
Archbishopric 46,380.68 
Jetty, JacmeL — ^ 111.040.33 
Total 4.903.145.46 
Total internal funded and floating debt 10,029,196.79 
Claims (estimated amount of allowances) 750,000.00 
External funded debt converted a 9Vi cents per franc 8.306.135.00 
Total public debt 19,085,331.79 
Less sinking fund reserves: 
Fiscal year 1915-16 $21,920.98 
Fiscal year 1920-21-
Port-au-prince $127,481.33 
New Yoik. 143.145.80 
270,627.13 
Fiscal years 1921-22 321.883.85 
614.431.96 
Net public debt 18.470.899.8319t 
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Appendix 2: Import and Export Figures, Fiscal Year 1918-19 
Imports: 
Wheat flour $2,708,772 
Rice 1,123,658 
Meat 191,847 
Other foods . 1,334,934 
Soap 839,756 
Cloth 4,789,814 
Iron and steel 731,227 
Tobacco 381,844 
Liquor, beer, and other beverages 129,212 
Automobiles 70,996 















Chief ports for imports: Port-au-Prince ($9,597,499) 
Cap-Haïtien ($2,301,909) 
Cayes ($1,469,278) 




Imports: United States (93%) 
Exports: United States (44%) 
France (52%)199 
97 
Appendix 3: Haitian Government Expenses since Fiscal Year 1914-15 
1. Sanitation (under the department of war), FY 1914-15 
Salaries for hospitals $7,666.80 
Supplies for hospitals 1,200.00 
Rations for hospitals 4.668.00 
13,534.80 
Since the Occupation, hospital expenses 





1921-22 (appropriated) 268,200.00. 
1. Expenses in 1920-21 were abnormally high due to a smallpox epidemic which cost 
about $48,000 to fight. 
2. Public Works, Fiscal Year 1914-15 
Repair of public buildings $8,000 
Repair of public roads 6,000 
Repair of prisons 7,000 
Repair of bridges 6,000 
Repair of wharves, etc. 7,000 
Nothing in 1914-15 was appropriated for construction Since the Occupation, 
"repair of prisons" was included under Gendarmerie allocations for maintenance and 
repair of prisons. 
Public works appropriation, FY 1919-20: 
Construction and repair of public buildings $24,000 
Repair and maintenance of streets, etc. 68,400 
Irrigation, etc. 24,000 
Ports, harbors, wharves, and quays 9,600 
Public roads, bridges, etc. 180,000 
Construction of school buildings, etc. 12,000 
Current expenditures did not include special projects like repaving the streets of 
Port-au-Prince, or the rebuilding of the Presidential Palace, both of which had been 
completed by 1921. In his testimony, Mcllhenny gave the past four years expenditures 
for public works: 
1917-1 8 $329,476.81 1919-20 $639,936.05 
1918-1 9 451,288.07 1920-21 526,925.63 
3. Education. The Haitian 1914-15 appropriation for education was $23,016.80; no 
figures were available as to their actual expenditures. Budget appropriations in 1919-20, 
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kept education at roughly $400,000, even though the salaries of Haitian teachers were 
raised 25% in 1919. In 1917, the Occupation contracted a Mr. Bourgeois as 
superintendent of education. His contract was terminated in 1920. In his final report, Mr. 
Bourgeois said the $360,000 that the Occupation was spending on education in Haiti was 
being thrown away because of the incompetence of the entire system. 
4. Justice. In 1914-15, the appropriation was $192,438, and again Mcllhenny could only 
assume the money was spent. In 1919-20 and 1920-21, the appropriation had been fixed 
at $245,759. 
5. Government Operations. No figures for the period prior to the Occupation apparently 
exist. In 1915-16, under Admiral Caperton's administration, the Haitian government was 
allotted $100,000 a month for governmental expenses. Since then their annual expenses 
have climbed slightly, partially because of a 19% pay increase for clerical workers 
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its entirety: 
"Your letter gave me at the same time much pleasure and some pain. It seemed to 
me as if I were hearing you speak-that was the pleasure; and it seemed to me that we 
were misunderstanding one another—that was the regret. I had the impression that you 
were a little tfned with me for not understanding your country and I on my side still feel 
that your country has not even begun to realize what Haiti is, not even distantly. 
"What is needed is not an intellectual operation, however subtle, but an intimate 
touch, an act of love making it possible to understand others, to make them part of 
oneself; that is, to get so close to them that we love them like ourselves—more than 
ourselves. This human thrill, this practical sympathy, I have found—to be frank without 
being unjust—in a few exceptional persons only, in Doctor Gruening, who love Haiti like 
a good Haitian, as a clear-sighted son would love his mother, and in some of the 
large-hearted women of this last mission to Haiti whom I had the opportunity of meeting. 
But you came and went like birds of passage; what you saw of this was necessarily their 
surface, a bird's-eye view. You would have needed to experience for a year, or six 
months at least, what we are suffering, to have felt the same revolt of conscience at 
legalized lying and triumphant injustice, to have had a sight of what lay under the cards, 
and of the reverse side of the medal. 
"Then only, then perhaps, you might begin to understand. Vbu would have to read 
many books—and to forget them again, see many people, talk with old men and women, 
and get them to tell you about the Haiti of the old days and compare and explain the past. 
You would have to go ever further back in our history and listen to the dead, you would 
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have to try to fathom the quiet of our starry nights and listen for the voices of our sleeping 
centuries. Ours is a land of beauty, but also a land of suffering, a people of tormentors 
and tormented. 
"Nevertheless a special form of civilization was created here, a social experiment 
was being worked out. The Negroes of old Haiti and the sons of the 'philosophe' 
colonialists of the XVIHcentury were developing a social order and shaping customs and 
ways inherited from the most civilized people of the world-those of old France-with the 
modifications inevitably brought about by the differences of climate and race. 
"Think of the unique drama that was being unfolded here. The first cause of our 
financial and economic bankruptcy was the long-continued rancor of France and the 
immense indemnity demanded from Haiti. Like a poor debt-burdened student beginning 
the world wholly without credit, Haiti had to live the life of a small and poor people in 
the midst of the hostility and sneers of stronger nations, without help or support I affirm, 
and no one can contradict me, that what we have accomplished under such conditions is 
very fine. 
"There is nothing in the history of Haiti that calls for shame or concealment It is 
the story of painful gropings, of the uncertain youthful steps of a little country, the 
difficult adolescence of a young nation. 
"I know they throw the history of Haiti in our face-its long tissue of revolutions 
and massacres. Yet the American war with the Cacos killed more people than 10 or 20 
revolutions put together, it devastated whole regions and ruined the cattle for Haiti, as 
veterinary experts can testify if they are honest Revolutions were fomented by 
foreigners-English, French, American, Dutch traders-who risked nothing, and always 
profited. Loans which dealt rather in human lives than in merchandise were made at rates 
of 1,000 per cent, and those who thus enriched themselves overthrew any government 
that was not subservient to them. 
"And the diplomatic claims made upon Haiti! They were a regular industry. 
What documents the chancelleries could offer to the sociologist and historian if they 
could! If it were they who were under indictment, many who are now accusing would 
have to lower their heads in shame and blush redder than are their hands, still stained with 
the blood of innocent men who were quite unaware of how they were being used. 
"I know-and I do not excuse—the Haitian accomplices in all this, ambitious men, 
bloody men. Ambition blinded them, as it still blinds many others, survivals of a 
disastrous past who are still with us, or our misfortune. These men were the agents of the 
invasion. Bad shepherds of a heedless flock, drunken pilots of a ship in distress, they 
consciously or unconsciously prepared the capitalist and militarist subjugation that we are 
now enduring. 
"For the honor of the Haitian name, for the pride of our élite have cherished, be it 
said that a succession of men of heart and capacity have continuously struggled and 
suffered for a civilized, a truly civilized, Haiti. The heroes who achieved independence 
had their successors. This is not sufficiently known, or rather it is persistently ignored. 
"Balthazar Inginac, finance minister under Pétion and Boyer, Boyer himself, a 
great president and a great statesman, who although beset by the greed of France, Spain, 
England, and (already) the United States, yet ruled Haiti for 25 years and brought to pass 
the voluntary union of the whole island under one government; Edmond Paul, the great 
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tribune and apostle of a liberal Haiti; Armand Thoby; Alcibiade Pommayrac, Justin 
Dévot, Léon Audain, Georges Sylvain, Auguste Albert, (perhaps I forget others)~any 
country would be honored to count such men as these among its sons. They are 
'representative men' such as Carlyle would put in his gallery, men who lived for their 
ideals and were ready to die for them. These are the witnesses of Haiti, our country, of 
our humiliated élite. Even when, like Anténo^Firmin, they sought to realize their ends by 
violence, the are excusable, for they meant well. 
"Efforts to help the masses have been made again and again and in many ways, 
but the poverty of our budgets and the instability due to the causes mentioned made 
progress difficult and slow. Nevertheless a Haitian civilization was in progress of 
development. This is what the men of your country do not understand. They came and 
interrupted it. They act like barbarians, for they have established nothing but a coarse 
materialism, the religion of money, the worship of force and success. I do not hate them, 
because it is not my turn of mind nor the way my feelings have been trained. I cannot any 
longer hate, but I despise them. That does not trouble them, I know; but I despise them 
for their sterile lack of understanding, for their vanity, men who are parvenues in matters 
of intellect and feeling. 
"Although foreign domination is never a good thing, medicine teaches us that 
painful operations sometimes effect a cure. The American invasion might have been a 
good thing if, although unjust and even infringing for a time upon our independence, it 
had been temporary and had led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But such is 
not the case. The Americans have not even this excuse. They have made themselves the 
allies of the evil past of oppression and tyranny; they have abolished liberty, justice, 
independence; they are bad administrators of the public funds; they offer a peace of 
degradation and subjection, shame and dishonor. They push forward like the rising tide; 
they attack our traditions, our soul. Is it not claimed that they want to change our culture, 
our religion? 
"Even the good that they do turns to our hurt, for instead of teaching us, they do it 
to prove that we are incapable. They are exploiters. How can they teach us when they 
have so much to learn themselves? I am not bitter as I may appear. If when you were 
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Every day I learn more, and things that I had felt and suspected prove to be true. It is not 
that I have been disillusioned unless you understand that to mean that I formerly hoped 
for a change peacefully brought about by mutual consent; in that sense—yes. I do not 
aspire to propose any plan. I do not desire to be given any government lace. My social 
position and relations would put fortune and honor within my reach, but I should feel 
myself an accomplice. I have long accepted poverty and obscurity. Poverty is painful 
only when you see those that you love suffering. 
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government, is a pretense and a lie. 
"It is a pathetic sight, a country that is being slowly killed. I am not an agitator. 
Like you I am opposed to useless gestures. I want to be a man of action to remain sincere 
and honest. 
"I should have liked to visit and know your country, for there must be sympathetic 
Americans capable of understanding all that I am trying to put before you. I should like 
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